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MUSCOGEE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: 
VHAKV EM PVTAKV1  
(THE CARPET UNDER THE LAW) 
Sarah Deer * and Cecilia Knapp ** 
PART I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1974, a group of Mvskoke2 citizens from Oklahoma sued the federal govern-
ment in federal court.3 Hanging in the balance was the future of Mvskoke self-
determination. The plaintiffs insisted that their 1867 Constitution remained in full effect, 
and that they still governed themselves pursuant to it. The United States argued that the 
constitution had been nullified by federal law passed in the early 1900s.4 
To find in favor of the plaintiffs, the court would have to rule that the United States 
had been ignoring the most basic civil rights of Mvskoke citizens and flouting the law for 
over seventy years. It would also have to find that a tribal government had been operat-
ing legitimately in the shadows—that the Mvskoke people had continued to operate un-
                                                          
 1.  Vhakv em pvtakv is the Mvskoke phrase most often used to describe the written constitution. See infra 
note 20 and accompanying text.  
 * Associate Professor, William Mitchell College of Law. J.D., University of Kansas, 1999. Mvto (thank 
you) to Rosemary McCombs Maxey, Ted Isham, Marcus Briggs-Cloud, Colette Routel, Rachel Kowarski, 
Doug Heidenreich, Patrick Moore, Melissa Tatum, Frank Pommersheim, Mike Steenson, David Prince, Ra-
leigh Levine, Niels Schaumann, Anna Light, Bethany Berger and Cal Bonde. While this co-author is a citizen 
of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, the opinions expressed in this article are her own and do not necessarily re-
flect the views of the Nation or any of its officers or employers. 
 ** J.D., 2013, William Mitchell College of Law. 
 2.  “Creek,” “Muscogee,” and “Mvskoke” will be used interchangeably throughout this paper to refer to 
the same nation of people. Mvskoke (pronounced muhs-GO-ghee) is the traditional word used to describe the 
largest cultural group in the Creek Nation. There have been a variety of spellings of Mvskoke over the last two 
centuries, including Muscogee, Muskogee, Muskoke, Maskoki and Maskoke. E.g., JACK B. MARTIN & 
MARGARET MCKANE MAULDIN, A DICTIONARY OF CREEK/MUSKOGEE xiii (2000). Mvskoke is the preferred 
spelling for many modern scholars and linguists. The spelling originates from a version of the alphabet adopted 
by the Muscogee (Creek) Tribe in the late 1800s. PAMELA INNES ET AL., BEGINNING CREEK: MVSKOKE 
EMPONVKV 3 (2004). The official federally recognized name of the tribal government described in this article 
is Muscogee (Creek) Nation. However, some government offices are beginning to embrace the Mvskoke no-
menclature in various significant publications (including the Supreme Court’s commissioned reporter). This 
return to early spelling is typical of tribal nations engaged in cultural and linguistic revitalization. The word 
“Creek” originated with the term the English used to identify the “Muskhogean group with whom they were 
first in contact, the Indians who lived on or near the upper Ocmulgee, i.e., ‘Ochese on Creek.’” Verner W. 
Crane, The Origin of the Name of the Creek Indians, 5 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 339, 342 (1918).  
 3.  Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.C. 1976). Harjo is a common Mvskoke surname (akin to the 
American “Smith” or “Jones”) and will appear frequently in this article. The name is sometimes translated into 
English as “crazy.” A more literal translation might be “recklessly brave.” 
 4.  The United States argued that the Mvskoke right to self-government had been extinguished by federal 
statute during the “allotment” era of Federal Indian law, when the federal government decided to compart-
mentalize tribal lands, distribute individual fee deeds to tribal members, and dissolve the tribal governments. 
Id. at 1118. 
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der their constitution for most of the twentieth century despite official federal antago-
nism.  
It was definitely a long shot, but they won. 
How did this tribal government continue to persevere and operate in spite of gen-
erations of official anti-tribal policies? In resolving the existential dispute, the federal 
judge engaged the rich constitutional history of the Mvskoke people,5 which dates back 
at least 500 years. After reviewing this history, the court labeled the federal policies of 
the United States as “bureaucratic imperialism.”6 The court found that the “vigor and 
liveliness of Creek political life,”7 documented since the Revolutionary Era, had sur-
vived the destruction of the Creek National Council in the twentieth century, and contin-
ued uncowed in the decades since.8 The decision led to a resurgence of Mvskoke politi-
cal identity and a new constitution in 1979. 
This article explores factors that have helped the Mvskoke people create, nurture, 
and sustain a constitutional government under hostile circumstances for centuries.9 We 
focus on the history and structure of the constitutional government of the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation of Oklahoma.10 We consider several aspects of Creek conceptions of 
government structure and balance, which are also evidenced in the constitutional juris-
prudence of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Supreme Court. At first glance, the contempo-
rary Mvskoke government today bears little resemblance to the ancient etvlwv town-
based system of governance,11 but a more penetrating analysis reveals common threads 
of political theory and cosmogony, or world view, that have continued unabated. 
Despite the rapidly emerging field of tribal constitutional jurisprudence, there are 
very few in-depth studies of how tribal governments interpret their own constitutions and 
whether these interpretations have furthered the aim of tribal self-governance. Tribal 
constitutional jurisprudence is “a unique contribution to the history of ideas,” and an es-
sential element in the continuing tribal struggle for self-determination.12 As explained by 
Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred, “renewal of respect for traditional values is the only 
lasting solution to the political, economic, and social problems that beset our people.”13 
This study does three things. It uncovers a distinctive constitutional tradition, chronicles 
the role of law in the history of a people who struggled and survived in the face of relent-
less pressure to disappear, and helps to strengthen the foundation on which Mvskoke 
people are building their future. 
                                                          
 5.  Id. at 1118-42.  
 6.  Id. at 1130. 
 7.  Id. at 1138. 
 8.  Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1138.  
 9.  While we have researched the archival record of early Mvskoke law extensively, it is important to be 
sensitive to the potential for observer bias, especially when relying on non-Native descriptions of tribal life.  
 10.  Muscogee (Creek) Nation is the official name of the federally recognized tribal government headquar-
tered in Okmulgee, Oklahoma. There are four other federally recognized tribal nations that share a common 
origin: The Poarch Band of Creek Indians (Alabama), the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, the Seminole Nation 
of Florida, and the Miccosukee Tribe (Florida). There are also “unrecognized” tribal nations that share a com-
mon heritage with the Muscogee (Creek) Nation.  
 11.  See discussion infra Part II.B.2 for a description of etvlwv structure.  
 12.  TAIAIAKE ALFRED, PEACE, POWER, RIGHTEOUSNESS: AN INDIGENOUS MANIFESTO 5 (1999). 
 13.  Id. Many tribal nations are “looking to the revitalization of Indigenous common law.” Joseph Thomas 
Flies-Away et al., Native Nation Courts: Key Players in Nation Rebuilding, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: 
STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 115, 127 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007).  
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Mvskoke constitutional law can be characterized as relatively young, but only if 
the written form (which dates to the 1860s) is used as the standard.14 Mvskoke constitu-
tional structure actually has a lengthy, complex history that dates back to at least the 
1500s. While a great deal of the structure has been heavily influenced by Anglo-
American law over the last 200 years, the Mvskoke philosophy of power balance is still 
evident in the constitutional law of the Nation today. 
In traditional, pre-removal Mvskoke society, maintaining harmony and sharing and 
balancing power were central components of the Mvskoke cosmogony. These goals were 
both important governmental pursuits, encompassing the management of conflict and the 
prevention of abuse and manipulation of power and key elements in the structure of tra-
ditional government systems. The Mvskoke people have had intricate conceptions of ver-
tical and horizontal power separation for centuries, and the Mvskoke government was 
characterized by checks and balances, democratic offices, and a vigorous marketplace of 
ideas long before the United States drafted the American Constitution.15 
To survive, however, the Mvskoke people and their constitutional structure had to 
adapt. The resiliency of the government has been possible because of a series of adapta-
tions and adjustments.16 Mvskoke law has exhibited exceptional resilience in the face of 
war, oppression, and coerced assimilation.17 Its power and legitimacy is driven by a tra-
ditional embrace of political dialogue that seeks to balance the desire for conflict with 
the necessity of finding balance and resolution in the midst of chaos and change. 
Part II of this article begins with unwritten Mvskoke governance, showing the in-
tegration of the concept of balancing powers with Mvskoke cosmogony. Part III consid-
ers the development of the centralized Creek Confederacy, which developed as a re-
sponse to European threats in present-day Alabama and Georgia. Part IV explores the 
removal and re-establishment of the Creek Confederacy in Indian Territory after remov-
al. Part V explores the post-U.S. Civil War experience, including the development of the 
1867 Constitution and subsequent Creek Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 1867 
Constitution. Part VI considers the devastating twentieth century history of the Creek 
Nation and its re-emergence in the 1970s. Part VII reviews the decisions of the Mus-
cogee (Creek) Supreme Court interpreting the 1979 Constitution. The article concludes 
with an assessment of the strength of independent Mvskoke constitutional jurisprudence. 
PART II: FOUNDATION: BCE-1832 
The Mvskoke people ratified the first recorded written constitution in 1867.18 
                                                          
 14.  Deloria and Lytle explain that “Indian tribes . . . had highly complicated forms of government that 
could be traced far back into precontact days and, according to some tribal traditions, back as far as their crea-
tion and migration stories told them intelligible life has existed.” VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, 
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 81 (1983). 
 15.  Alexander v. Gouge, 8 Okla. Trib. 1, 3 (Sup. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2003).  
 16.  Patrice Kunesh explains, “[a]s complex social systems, tribes have survived war, destitution, and deni-
gration and have continually reconstructed their course and intention for the future.” Patrice H. Kunesh, Con-
stant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration in Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 8, 13 
(2009). 
 17.  CRAIG S. WOMACK, RED ON RED: NATIVE AMERICAN LITERARY SEPARATISM 31 (1999) (stating that 
“Creeks provide an interesting historical example in terms of the way an indigenous culture might actually 
flourish in the face of change”).  
 18.  See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of 1867 Constitution. 
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However, that was not the first constitution that governed the Mvskoke people. We begin 
by exploring fundamental social and political values of the Mvskoke culture. In order to 
understand how the Mvskoke people may have conceived of, or responded to, the devel-
opment of a written constitution, we must first understand the worldview of the drafters. 
This cultural backdrop will also allow for a better understanding of how legal hegemony 
may have affected constitutional principles identity over time. 
A.  Cultural Foundations of Mvskoke Governance 
An exploration of Mvskoke constitutional law necessitates beginning with oral tra-
ditions that establish core political values. A “constitution” is “a society’s rules for mak-
ing and enforcing its collective rules and decisions, including the legitimate allocation of 
power and authority over rule-making and decision-making.”19 In the Mvskoke lan-
guage, the constitution is called vhakv em pvtakv or “the carpet under the law.”20 A con-
stitution, in other words, is the foundation for the entire legal system. Constitutions may 
be written or unwritten; indeed, scholars have argued unwritten constitutional norms and 
values may be more powerful because they reflect and are expressed in everyday activi-
ties as well as high level conflicts.21 
Political values in many cultures can be traced to pre-written symbols and myths.22 
Contemporary tribal governments have struggled to align these pre-written myths and 
legends with their constitutional jurisprudence, as “federal policies of termination, relo-
cation, and assimilation” have weakened, romanticized, and marginalized the importance 
of the repositories of fundamental values.23 This section uncovers those Mvskoke early 
pre-written cultural norms, and shows how they help to form the “carpet under the law.” 
Part of the cultural foundation for separate and decentralized powers in Mvskoke 
government is reflected in a legend about two powerful, rival twins.24 In this creation 
story, these two twins struggled to balance their energies. After wrestling to the point of 
exhaustion, their spirits led them up to the mists and clouds.25 The more contemplative 
                                                          
 19.  Joseph Kalt, Constitutional Rule and the Effective Governance of Native Nations, in AMERICAN INDIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 184, 187 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006). 
 20.  The authors are indebted to Rosemary McCombs Maxey for helping us understand the literal translation 
of the phrase. 
 21.  See Jane Pek, Things Better Left Unwritten?: Constitutional Text and the Rule of Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1979, 2002–03 (2008) (“Core parts of the unwritten constitution are rooted in custom, tradition, and prec-
edent. Conventions, which have a much more significant role to play in an unwritten constitution, are predicat-
ed upon obedience and obligation—qualities that only become apparent over time and with consistent applica-
tion of the convention in question”). 
 22.  DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 6 (1988) (“Essentially a people 
share symbols and myths that provide meaning to their existence together and link them to some transcendent 
order. They can thus act together and answer . . . basic political questions”). 
 23.  Eric D. Lemont, Introduction, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING 
OF NATIVE NATIONS 1, 4 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006). 
 24.  There are many different versions of this story. In addition, because of the nature of oral tradition, it is 
unlikely that a written English recounting of this Mvskoke story will be entirely accurate. Certainly much can 
be lost in translation. For many indigenous people, reducing oral tradition to writing is problematic because the 
codification process itself weakens the power and subtleties of the oral recitation. See, e.g., Christine Zuni 
Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality and Separate Consciousness [Re]Incorporating Customs and 
Traditions into Tribal Law, TRIBAL L.J. (2009), http://tlj.unm.edu/tribal-law-
journal/articles/volume_1/zuni_cruz/index.php.  
 25.  JEAN CHAUDHURI & JOYOTPAUL CHAUDHURI, A SACRED PATH: THE WAY OF THE MUSCOGEE CREEKS 
31 (2001).  
2013] MUSCOGEE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 127 
White Twin went one way, while the more aggressive and active Red Twin went another 
way.26 Each twin met groups of people who became their followers.27 After reuniting, 
the twins decided to bring the two groups, or worlds, together.28 “One world was full of 
active energy, but faced conflict without adequate ‘medicine,’ while the other had the 
medicinal resources but lacked the organization to deal with external conflicts and the 
extraction of medicine.”29 “Together, they could be awesome.”30 
To join the peoples, Red Twin lobbied for a fight, whereas White Twin preferred 
to talk things through in a council-like setting.31 Ultimately, the twins decided to avoid 
war and instead have the peoples play the “little brother of war,” a stick ball game.32 
Much negotiation ensued: Red tried to get White to settle on what weapons could be 
used and the rules by which the game would be played, but White ended up leading the 
dialogue and advocating for the avoidance of as much pain and suffering as possible.33 In 
this back-and-forth dialogue, each twin exhibited certain characteristics embedded in 
Creek symbolism: “whites provide the long-term community-building and peace, while 
the reds provide the activism, the security, and the energies for battle.”34 When the sym-
bolic war was over, “there was the coming together of a community based on reconcilia-
tion and love,” and the twins then descended from the mists back down to earth, “know-
ing the way of balancing and cooperation in human affairs.”35 
The red-white struggle and subsequent resolution explains a foundational tenet of 
Mvskoke law: the search for balance and consensus is a primary virtue in government 
and spiritual life. Appropriately, the seal of the Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Court is an 








                                                          
 26.  Id. at 31–32.  
 27.  Id. at 32-33. 
 28.  Id. at 34. 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id. at 33. 
 31.  Id. at 34. 
 32.  Id. at 35, 41. 
 33.  Id. at 34-35.  
 34.  Id. at 38. 
 35.  Id. at 40. 














B.  Structure and Function of Traditional Mvskoke Government 
Long before the Mvskoke people had a written constitution, they had social and 
political structures which formed the foundation of their government. Taken as a whole, 
these structures can be considered a form of democracy, although “Creek democracy . . . 
was not mob rule—the process of consent included interlinked centers of decision-
making, with checks and balances apparently intended to avoid the development of a 
permanent political elite.”36 A key theme in Mvskoke governance, then, was not individ-
ualism but community balance. “The Creeks . . . depend[ed] on extensive notions of bal-
ance among different virtues, qualities, and functions.”37 The traditional governing sys-
tem of the Mvskoke people is complex. Perhaps the easiest starting point is to begin with 
the way the identity of an individual Mvskoke person is inherited and related to others.38 
                                                          
 36.  Id. at 73. Matthew L.M. Fletcher explains, “most Indian nations did not view government as a process 
of coercion of the masses by an enlightened few.” MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 
1 (2011). 
 37.  CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 92. 
 38.  We describe the Mvskoke clan identity in the present tense because this factor (and other traditions) 
continues to be relevant to many Mvskoke people today. See Amelia Rector Bell, Separate People: Speaking of 
Creek Men and Women, 92 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 332, 333 (1990). Womack and other indigenous theorists 
suggest that using present tense in descriptions of cultural identifiers is important, especially in light of the fact 
that “[t]he overwhelming majority of books written about Creeks are written by non-Native authors who write 
in the past tense and assume that the people whom they are writing about no longer exist.” WOMACK, supra 
note 17, at 28. In the Mvskoke language, there are four “past tenses,” which makes discussion about 
past/present more nuanced than English.  
2013] MUSCOGEE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 129 
A basic understanding of the layers of Mvskoke identity will help demonstrate the 
breadth of change and adaption over time, which provides a context to consider how the 
contemporary written constitution may or may not reflect Mvskoke belief systems. 
Each Mvskoke person identifies as a clan member, e.g., deer clan or wind clan.39 
Traditionally, each Mvskoke person also identified as a member of an etvlwv (town) 
government.40 The towns were self-governing, autonomous entities that would form the 
basis for the Creek Confederacy.41 Clans and towns were classified as either “red” or 
“white”—a subdivision called “moiety” in Western anthropology.42 Red towns were 
primarily responsible for war and the white towns were responsible for peace, but be-
cause of the overlapping citizenship of the towns, every town had red and white families 
who necessarily collaborated and competed for a role in the governance of the town.43 
This dynamic created a tradition of vigorous debate and is central to the resiliency of the 
Mvskoke people. These debates have sometimes led to factionalism, violence, and even 
civil war under the stress of occupation, removal, and civic disenfranchisement from the 
United States. 
The Creek Confederacy has traditionally been composed of red towns and white 
towns, but members of red and white clans lived together within the towns.44 Thus, clan 
and moiety cut across geographical boundaries. These intricate interconnections were 
inherent to the social system of the Mvskoke people. This created a system of overlap-
ping alliances and loyalties that developed over centuries by the Mvskoke, ensuring a 
balance of power within local government and across the Confederacy. 
Each Mvskoke person was born with multiple roles and duties within the family, 
the town, and potentially, within the confederacy, which encouraged vigorous civil en-
gagement.45 Many facets of identity are inherited, but heredity is not the only factor in 
determining responsibilities within the government.46 Age, gender, training, ability, and 
military service are also considerations in identifying the unique, customized civic role.47 
Unlike modern constitutional legal systems, Mvskoke people carried their legal system 
within themselves. By understanding Mvskoke cosmogony and legendary stories, citi-
zens understood why the system was structured the way it was and their role in it; “[citi-
zens] performing their assigned roles and educated accordingly made the system 
work.”48 
                                                          
 39.  George E. Lankford, Red and White: Some Reflections on Southeastern Symbolism, 50 S. FOLKLORE 
53, 54 (1993). 
 40.  Ross Hassig, Internal Conflict in the Creek War of 1813-1814, 21 ETHNOHISTORY 251, 252 (1974). 
 41.  WOMACK, supra note 17, at 31. 
 42.  Lankford, supra note 39, at 68. 
 43.  Hassig, supra note 40, at 253-54. 
 44.  Id. at 252; Lankford, supra note 39, at 74-75. 
 45.  “Factionalism . . .  was encouraged rather than discouraged.” STEVEN C. HAHN, THE INVENTION OF THE 
CREEK NATION, 1670-1763, at 95 (2004).  
 46.  Corkran identifies three key factors in the power structure of this model—age/service; heredity; and 
service to the people. DAVID H. CORKRAN, THE CREEK FRONTIER, 1540-1783, at 23 (1967). 
 47.  See CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 77-80. 
 48.  Id. at 76.  
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1.  Clan 
A Mvskoke person inherits primary identity—clan membership—from her or his 
maternal family.49 Clans, which form the foundation of identity and Mvskoke relation-
ships, first appeared in Mvskoke genesis stories and have no true parallel in Anglo-
American law.50 Clan structure is closely intertwined with spiritual and civic (legal) du-
ties.51 Thus, an individual learns her or his inherited civic responsibility from childhood. 
Today there are nine Mvskoke clans, but originally there were between twenty-five and 
twenty-seven clans.52 The interrelationships and kinship networks established in the clan 
system served as an early form of political checks and balances in Mvskoke society.53 
The blood relationship that ties members of a clan together was stronger than any other 
form of affiliation or membership.54 Traditionally, relationships between clans were 
strictly regulated.55 Clans also created extended kin networks that would be recognized 
wherever an individual traveled.56 This familial interconnectedness often served to tem-
per conflict between two or more political divisions. 
The intricate kinship rules and regulations of clan membership provided the struc-
ture for domestic governance, including rules for marriage, divorce, child custody, and 
interpersonal crime.57 The basic domestic unit was known as a huti, which included not 
                                                          
 49.  INNES ET AL., supra note 2, at 72; see also MICHAEL D. GREEN, INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA: THE 
CREEKS 23 (1990) [hereinafter GREEN, THE CREEKS].  
 50.  Deloria and Lytle write: 
The primacy of the Creek clans, for example, could be traced back to an early condition 
of chaos in which humans and animals were lost in an immensely thick fog. In order to 
save themselves the people and the animals joined hands and wandered for many days. 
Finally, as the fog was clearing and open skies could be discerned, they agreed that 
henceforth the clans would rank in the order in which they had emerged from the dread-
ful fog. Such a tradition clearly ranks with the Exodus and other stories cherished by the 
Western peoples, extending significantly far into the past, as a revered explanation of the 
manner in which the Creek Nation organized itself.  
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 14, at 81–82. 
 51.  See CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 76.  
 52.  INNES ET AL., supra note 2, at 72. The contemporary clans are Wind (Hotvlkvlke), Alligator (Hvlpvtvl-
ke), Bear (Nokosvlke), Tiger (Kaccvlke), Deer (Ecovlke), Sweet Potato (Vhvlvkvlke), Raccoon (Wotkvlke), 
Beaver (Echaswvlke), and Bird (Foswvlke). Id. See also CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 21 
(“[t]welve clans were created at first”); John R. Swanton, A Foreword on the Social Organization of the Creek 
Indians, 14 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 593, 594 (1912) (naming 25 clans). 
 53.  CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 92. 
 54.  “The strongest link in their political and social standing as a nation is in their clanship or families. By 
their observances of it they are so united that there is no part of the nation detached from the other, but are all 
linked harmonised [sic] and consolidated as one large connected family.” CAMERON BRAXTON WESSON, 
HOUSEHOLDS AND HEGEMONY: EARLY CREEK PRESTIGE GOODS, SYMBOLIC CAPITAL, AND SOCIAL POWER 24-
25 (1997). Clans themselves were categorized as white or red. DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL ORDER AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS AMONG THE CHEROKEE, THE CHOCTAW, THE 
CHICKASAW, AND THE CREEK 42 (1992). White clans generally performed domestic, internal governance. Red 
clans generally provided law enforcement and military protection. White clans and towns were authoritative in 
times of peace; red clans and red towns were authoritative in times of war. JOEL W. MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT: 
THE MUSKOGEES’ STRUGGLE FOR A NEW WORLD 82 (1991) [hereinafter MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT]. 
 55.  Intra-clan marriages, for example, were forbidden (and considered a form of incest). ANGIE DEBO, THE 
ROAD TO DISAPPEARANCE: A HISTORY OF THE CREEK INDIANS 16 (1941). 
 56.  See Arthur H. DeRosier, Jr., The Destruction of the Creek Confederacy, in FORKED TONGUES AND 
BROKEN TREATIES 78 (Donald E. Worcester ed., 1975) (“Without a doubt, clan loyalty took precedence over 
town or even tribal loyalty”). For example, a bear clan member from one etvlwv would owe certain responsibil-
ities and respect to bear clan members residing in any other etvlwv.  
 57.  Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 
 
2013] MUSCOGEE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 131 
only nuclear family members, but also extended kinship.58 A group of huti created a po-
litical/social organization known as an etvlwv, the most important political unit in the 
pre-constitutional era. 
           2.  Etvlwv (Town) 
After clan identity, the etvlwv59 was historically the most “potent political identifi-
er” in Mvskoke culture.60 Each etvlwv was made up of twenty-five to one hundred hous-
es nearly always geographically placed near a river or a stream.61 “[H]eredity and tradi-
tions” united the people of an etvlwv.62 The Mvskoke people physically centered each 
etvlwv around a sacred fire, which they ceremonially extinguished and renewed each 
year. 
Because there was no centralized government, each etvlwv operated an independ-
ent government, which usually met daily.63 These governments were not comprised of 
“insulated compartments”; nor did they have a “permanent, separate bureaucracy.”64 
However, there were some consistent features including parallels to executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial functions. 
For each etvlwv, there was a head executive known as a mekko.65 A typical etvlwv 
                                                                                                                                               
277, 297 (1993): 
Political rights and responsibilities arise from genealogy and are highly differentiated. 
Kinship assigns fixed roles to individuals, as if they were species in an ecosystem. At the 
same time, each individual plays multiple roles in relation to others: as a father to one, 
uncle to another, cousin to still another. Thus, a tribal political system is a web of recip-
rocal relationships without a separately institutionalized “state.” 
 58.  ROBBIE ETHRIDGE, CREEK COUNTRY: THE CREEK INDIANS AND THEIR WORLD 74 (2003). 
 59.  Pronounced DULL-wah (leading e is silent). Alternate spelling includes tvlwv, talwa, etulwa, or etawla. 
English and Americans typically translated this term as town or village. A more accurate translation would be 
“nation.” Referring to the etvlwv as a town implies a degree of inferiority. Mvto to Marcus Briggs-Cloud for 
providing more context for this word. 
 60.  ANGELA PULLEY HUDSON, CREEK PATHS AND FEDERAL ROADS: INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND SLAVES IN 
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 3 (2010). See also Joel W. Martin, Rebalancing the World in the Con-
tradictions of History: Creek/Muskogee, in NATIVE RELIGIONS AND CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA: 
ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SACRED 85, 94 (Lawrence E. Sullivan ed., 2000) [hereinafter Martin, Rebalancing the 
World]. MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 50; WOMACK, supra note 17, at 35. 
 61.  DeRosier, supra note 56, at 74; see DEBO, supra note 55, at 9; see also SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN 
INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 22 (1989). 
 62.  Morris Edward Opler, The Creek “Town” and the Problem of Creek Indian Political Reorganization, in 
HUMAN PROBLEMS IN TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: A CASEBOOK 165, 170 (Edward H. Spicer ed., 1952). A 
woman retained the tribal town affiliation of her mother and husbands took on the etvlwv identity of their 
wives. Bell, supra note 38, at 333. 
 63.  WILLIAM BARTRAM, OBSERVATIONS ON THE CREEK AND CHEROKEE INDIANS 23 (1789); see also 
Ohland Morton, The Government of the Creek Indians, 8 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 42, 42 (1930). 
 64.  CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 76, 92. 
 65.  Also spelled micco or miko. See, e.g., THEDA PERDUE & MICHAEL D. GREEN, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE 
TO AMERICAN INDIANS OF THE SOUTHEAST 48 (2001). A mekko (almost always male) often inherits his posi-
tion from a maternal uncle, but the leadership position is not strictly hereditary. English speakers often used the 
word “king” to describe this position, but the mekko role was actually nothing like that of a European monarch. 
See DONALD E. GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE 5-6 (1973) [hereinafter GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE]; see also 
CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 76 (“community acceptance determined whether one became a 
micco”). Other English translations include “chief” and “mayor.” Today, a traditional mekko is a lifetime posi-
tion. George Thompson, Statement From Hickory Ground Chief George Thompson Regarding Poarch Creek’s 
Digging up of Remains, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/statement-from-hickory-ground-chief-george-thompson-
regarding-poarch-creeks-digging-up-of-remains-133259. A mekko is “a person who had achieved great honor 
and trust” who “ruled by persuasion, not command or coercion.” See, e.g., PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 
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also has three tiers of male leaders or advisors, which traditionally performed more legis-
lative functions.66 Historically, the mekko would select a tvstvnvke (war chief) from one 
of the red clans, who served as chief advisor on military and law enforcement matters.67 
From one of the white clans, the mekko would select one or more hennehas (spiritual 
leader), who exercised administrative domestic powers, such as building homes and 
farming.68 Typically, one henneha served as the “speaker” for the mekko.69 The mekko 
also selected a third group of advisors, known as vcakvlke (“beloved old men”), for their 
wisdom achieved through age and service.70 The etvlwv leaders did not adjudicate inter-
personal disputes, but focused on the administration of the local government, including 
food distribution, agricultural planning, and security.71 
In traditional, pre-removal72 Mvskoke government, there was no formal separate or 
neutral judiciary. Clan and household negotiations resolved inter-clan and intra-clan dis-
putes involving matters of injury and personal property.73 A system of councils, includ-
ing the family, the clan, or the etvlwv oversaw inter-clan dispute resolution.74 The Na-
tion’s current Supreme Court explained that “[u]nder traditional Mvskoke law, 
controversies were resolved by clan Vculvkvlke (elders). Their integrity was considered 
beyond reproach. “They were obligated by the responsibilities of their position to decide 
cases fairly, and honestly, regardless of clan or family affiliation.”75 
Because Mvskoke people valued consensus, the most important skill a political 
leader could possess was oratory.76 Lengthy speeches were the hallmark of an effective 
civic leader, and most decisions were not made until after all leaders had an opportunity 
                                                                                                                                               
48 (“Chiefs earned their positions by their accomplishments rather than inheriting rank by birth”). See also 
O’BRIEN, supra note 61, at 22. A mekko often worked with a second mekko (mekko vpoktv or “twin chief”). 
ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 102. Thus, local town structure could be said to have a dual executive. This con-
cept of dual executive later was incorporated into the Creek Confederacy. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 66.  Mvskoke women were often assumed to be politically powerless by early European observers. Euro-
American observers came from a world in which women did not govern—so the activities of women would not 
be as keenly watched. However, Mvskoke women were the actual owners of the land. Thus, they had signifi-
cant political power that was exercised in that context. At the very least, there is evidence clan matriarchs did 
exercise political influence. The word “beloved” is used to describe these Creek matriarchs, and the word “be-
loved” generally was used to describe officials associated with the white moiety. Ethridge explains, “[a]lthough 
they had no official voice, southeastern Indian women influenced public opinion and councils by influencing 
their male kin through informal channels.” ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 105; see also CHAUDHURI & 
CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 50 (“While men had the edge in actual fighting, women had the edge in actual 
authority. Together they worked toward bringing harmony in the midst of the imperfections of life”); PERDUE 
& GREEN, supra note 65, at 48.  
 67.  O’BRIEN, supra note 61, at 22. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id.  
 70.  Id. at 23; see also ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 102. 
 71.  See Arrell M. Gibson, Constitutional Experiences of the Five Civilized Tribes, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
17, 18-19 (1974).  
 72.  Most Mvskoke people were forced to relocate to Indian Territory in the early nineteenth century. Thus, 
“pre-removal” refers to the government prior to the relocation. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 73.  CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 91. 
 74.  Id. at 90–91. 
 75.  In re The Practice of Law Before the Courts of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 9 Okla. Trib. 31, 33 (S. 
Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2005). This is a rare but important example of the contemporary court us-
ing Mvskoke language in its decision. 
 76.  ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 105. Ethridge describes the Creek people as “famously argumentative.” Id. 
at 108. 
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to speak without time limits until consensus could be reached.77 Election or appointment 
to political office was done by voting in public—not by secret ballot.78 When disputes 
between members of an etvlwv, or between two different etvlwv could not be resolved 
through consensus, a typical response was to withdraw and separate.79 Sometimes mem-
bers who withdrew would establish a new etvlwv.80 Thus, historical records demonstrate 
the spontaneous creation of new etvwlv as well as the merging of two more etvlwv. 
            3.  Moieties— Semi-Divisions 
As noted previously, the Mvskoke people traditionally classified both towns and 
clans as white or red.81 Both white and red clans lived in each etvlwv, and the leading 
clan determined the color of the etvlwv. These colors symbolized the primary role of the 
town or clan—association with foreign powers or domestic powers.82 The clans and 
towns affiliated with the color red performed external relations duties (including military 
defense, diplomacy, and commerce), whereas clans and towns affiliated with the color 
white performed domestic duties (including ceremonies, family law, crime, probate, and 
making of peace).83 
Mvskoke cosmogony stressed the importance of separation of powers between mil-
itary and civilian leaders.84 This division of military and treaty power was especially im-
portant for the balance of power.85 While the military branch engaged in physical war-
fare, the peace-making branch worked toward ultimate resolution. “[R]eckless rashness” 
was expected of young warriors.86 However, Mvskoke people were also expected to ma-
ture and develop “moderation and wisdom” later in life.87 In the European construct of 
war, a military leader could accept a surrender or negotiate a truce. Not so for the 
Mvskoke. Normally, the mekkos from the white clans in white etvlwv governments 
would draft peace agreements and terms of disengagement. The tension between the 
white and red towns, then, served a functional purpose. The rivalry resulted in vigorous 
debates about matters of national security and a role for cooler heads to prevail in negoti-
                                                          
 77.  See id. at 105. Consensus is a recurrent theme in tribal law. See Robert D. Cooter & Woflgang 
Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 
287, 319 (1998). 
 78.  John H. Moore, The Mvskoke National Question in Oklahoma, 52 SCI. & SOC’Y 163, 166-67 (1988). 
 79.  ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 96. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  See MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 40 (“The distinguishing colors were painted on build-
ings and ceremonial articles and used in bodily decoration”); see also Opler, supra note 62, at 171-72. 
 82.  O’BRIEN, supra note 61, at 22. Sometimes these colors are referred to as “war” or “peace” colors but in 
practice these divisions were not always so polarized. PATRICIA RILES WICKMAN, THE TREE THAT BENDS: 
DISCOURSE, POWER, AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE MASKOKI PEOPLE 48 (1999); see also CHAUDHURI & 
CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 38 (noting that “in Creek symbolism the white sticks provide the long-run 
community-building and peace, while the reds provide the activism, the security, and the energies for battle.”). 
 83.  See, e.g., BARTRAM, supra note 63, at 61 (“Whenever the question of war or peace was discussed in the 
national council, it was the duty of the white towns to bring forward all the arguments which could be adduced 
in favor of peace.”). Within such domestic realms, it was unusual for a person affiliated with a red town to have 
a say in domestic matters. See DeRosier, supra note 56, at 73; see also Mary R. Haas, Creek Inter-Town Rela-
tions, 42 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 479, 484-85 (1940). 
 84.  DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 14, at 85-86. 
 85.  CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 30.  
 86.  Id. at 25.  
 87.  Id. at 26. 
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ating terms of peace. Philosophically, Mvskoke governments did not seek to initiate or 
sustain war. Governing structures worked together for wholeness. Wholeness was con-
ceived as a balance between red “war” spirit and white “peace” spirit.88 
C.  Creek Confederacy 
The colonial historical records refer to the predecessor of the contemporary 
Mvskoke governments as the “Creek Confederacy.”89 The autonomous etvwlv govern-
ments created this Confederacy in response to external threats. While there was no writ-
ten constitution governing the activities of the early Confederacy, there were clear con-
stitutional principles at play—including division of powers and organized law-making.90 
1.  Early Period: 1500s-1776 
Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Mvskoke etvlwv governments and 
allied tribal communities formalized a union which would ultimately come to be known 
as the Creek Confederacy.91 Historians disagree about exactly when the Creek Confeder-
acy evolved into a political entity, but most surmise that the various etvlwv governments 
of the Creek Confederacy were loosely organized prior to the arrival of Europeans.92 
Lewis and Kneberg claim that “[l]ong before Columbus, they organized a great confed-
eracy that included more than a dozen Muskhogean tribes, and others as well.”93 The ear-
liest European contact with Mvskoke people happened in the early sixteenth century with 
                                                          
 88.  Martin, Rebalancing the World, supra note 60, at 92.  
 89.  See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 60, at 8. Originally, Mvskoke cultural groups (understood as organized 
groups of matrilineal clans) occupied a significant portion of southeastern North America—today Alabama, 
Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina. Barbara Alice Mann, “A Man of Misery”: Chitto Harjo and the Senate 
Select Committee on Oklahoma Statehood, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPEAKERS OF THE EASTERN WOODLANDS: 
SELECTED SPEECHES AND CRITICAL ANALYSES 197, 197 (Barbara Alice Mann ed., 2001). Mvskoke people 
historically lived throughout at least a 62,000 square mile region, but by the 1600s had settled on an approxi-
mately 500 square mile area in present-day Alabama and Georgia. HUDSON, supra note 60, at 3. Because iden-
tification with the Creek confederacy was a fluid phenomenon, population estimates also vary. The estimates 
range from 7,000-35,000 people living in between sixty and ninety political units. The difficulty in defining the 
precise history of the Creek Confederacy is illustrated by the following examples. David Corkran claims that 
7,000-9,000 Mvskoke people lived in approximately sixty towns. CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 6. Bolster claims 
25,000-35,000 Mvskoke people were loosely organized in the 1780s. Mel H. Bolster, The Smoked Meat Rebel-
lion, 31 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 37, 40 (1953). Duane Champagne asserts that there were originally eighty to ninety 
towns. CHAMPAGNE, supra note 54, at 37.  
 90.  JOYOTPAUL CHAUDHURI, FOUNDING AMERICA: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF RIGHTS, RELIGION, 
COMMERCE, AND DIVERSITY 13 (1992) (explaining that the Creek Confederacy “demonstrated a complex sys-
tem of balanced authority”).  
 91.  “Regardless of its precise origin, the Confederacy is considered the hallmark of the Creek strategy for 
cultural survival during the historic period.” WESSON, supra note 54, at 44. John H. Moore writes that the 
Mvskoke word for the confederacy may have been “etelaketa.” Moore, supra note 78, at 170. There is no pre-
cise English translation for this word, but a loose English translation would be “The People Sitting Together.” 
See e-mail from Rosemary McCombs Maxey, to author (Aug. 26, 2011) (on file with author).  
 92.  See, e.g., INNES ET AL., supra note 2, at 28; see also William C. Sturtevant, Creek into Seminole, in 
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 92, 93 (Eleanor Burke Leacock & Nancy Oestreich 
Lurie eds., 1971). But see Vernon James Knight, Jr., The Formation of the Creeks, in THE FORGOTTEN 
CENTURIES: INDIANS AND EUROPEANS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1521-1704 , at  373, 375 (Charles Hudson & 
Carmen Chaves Tesser eds., 1994) (claiming that “[t]here is no documentary evidence of any such political 
centralization prior to the eighteenth century.”).  
 93.  THOMAS M.N. LEWIS & MADELINE KNEBERG, TRIBES THAT SLUMBER: INDIANS OF THE TENNESSEE 
REGION 93 (1958). 
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the exploits of Hernando De Soto of Spain.94 Spanish Conquistadors devastated 
Mvskoke populations through violence and disease in the sixteenth century.95 The sur-
viving Mvskoke continued their etvwlv governments where possible, but many had to 
merge together for protection and survival. 
Spanish tyranny continued to threaten the Mvskoke way of life throughout most of 
the seventeenth century.96 The newer English colonies on the east coast seemed less 
threatening, so Mvskoke leaders began to enter into agreements with the English. 
Charles Town, established in 1670 by English immigrants in the Carolina colony, was 
likely the first permanent European settlement in Mvskoke Territory.97 It was during this 
time period that the Confederacy first appeared as a legal entity in historical docu-
ments.98 
The Confederacy was originally a cooperative agreement among several tribes 
with different languages and traditions.99 The Creek Confederacy included Mvskoke 
etvwlv governments, but also a variety of allied cultural groups.100 Today, the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation government presents confederacy history, and explains that “the 
[C]onfederation was also expanded by the addition of tribes conquered by towns of the 
[C]onfederacy, and, in time, by the incorporation of tribes and fragments of tribes devas-
tated by the European imperial powers.”101 
A confederated government was seen as necessary for foreign relations once Euro-
pean settlement took hold. However, Mvskoke people remained more likely to identify 
with their etvlwv than with the Confederacy. Only in times of international crisis did 
Mvskoke people refer to themselves as “Creeks.”102 The early Confederacy did adopt 
                                                          
 94.  Moore writes that “De Soto encountered at least three etvlwvs (towns) in 1540—Chiaha, Koasati and 
Tulsa.” Moore, supra note 78, at 164. Mvskoke jurist Patrick Moore writes, “[m]any of these towns visited by 
Hernando De Soto in the summer of 1539 were later abandoned or simply ceased to exist due to De Soto’s 
ruthless military exploitation or the effects of diseases brought to the ‘New World’ by his soldiers and serv-
ants.” Patrick Edward Moore, Muscogee (Creek) Government Pre-Columbian to 2005, in 1 MVSKOKE LAW 
REPORTER, at XI (Melissa L. Tatum & Michelle Grunstad eds., 2005) [hereinafter Moore, Government Pre-
Columbian]. 
 95.  CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 138; GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 17–18. Dis-
ease included smallpox, measles, and influenza. Martin, Rebalancing the World, supra note 60, at 92. 
 96.  CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 48. 
 97.  GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 27.  
 98.  By 1789, Bartram, an English botanist, declared the Creeks to be “a very powerful Confederacy.” Bar-
tram, supra note 63, at 11. Deloria and Lytle conclude that the formation of the Confederacy was necessarily 
colored by the contact with Europeans: “The Creeks . . . evolved toward the European style of political organi-
zation because it was simpler to do so and because the preservation of the peace with European powers made it 
necessary.” DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 14, at 86. 
 99.  “The confederacy united diverse [etvlwvs or towns] for larger objectives, including wars with other 
polities over contested territories and hunting grounds.” MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 50.  
 100.  Corkran, for example, explains, “Creeks had a genius for taking fragments of other tribes under their 
wing.” CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 4. More than five languages were spoken in the Confederacy as of the late 
16th century. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 20 (“[t]here were perhaps six distinct languages spoken 
among the Creeks”); see also ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 30. Scholars have suggested that the Confederacy is 
a bona fide political alliance (as opposed to a group of culturally affiliated sub-groups) because of linguistic 
diversity. See GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE, supra note 65, at 4-5. Allied towns did not always share a common 
language, but nonetheless agreed to partner in important military alliances. The Confederacy was more likely a 
blend of cultural and political authority (particularly since the Mvskoke cosmogony does not separate spiritual 
and secular authority). 
 101.  Muscogee (Creek) Nation History, MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION, http://www.muscogeenation-
nsn.gov/Pages/History/history.html (last visited June 8, 2013). 
 102.  ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 93. 
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some national legislation,103 but its primary purpose was to address foreign relationships 
in both war and peace with European governments.104 Throughout the 1700s and 1800s, 
the Creek Confederacy made treaties with the British, Spanish, French, and American 
governments.105 
The treaty decision-making body for the Confederacy was often referred to as 
“Grand Council” and the leaders came together annually (or more often if needed). The 
Creek Confederacy governed by consent. Each individual etvlwv government retained 
independence and autonomy, and its leaders had the freedom to choose whether to send 
representatives to participate in the Grand Council each year.106 Like the etvlwv govern-
ments, the Confederacy had constitutional elements, although the structure was never put 
to writing. But some Confederation-wide policies and protocols were widely followed, 
which led to comprehensive policies on diplomacy and war. The common cultural ideals 
“gave some substance to the central Creek set of governmental and normative umbrellas 
without a central bureaucracy.”107 
Each etvlwv in the Confederacy could send representatives to the Grand Council. 
Representatives from red towns became known among Europeans as “Warriors” and rep-
resentatives from the white towns were known as “Kings.”108 The Confederacy’s struc-
ture itself was set up in a similar manner to that of a typical etvlwv government.109 Three 
categories of leaders made up the National Council: the mekkos (chiefs), the vcakvlke 
(beloved men), and the henehas (spiritual leaders).110 While it was not typical for the 
Creeks to recognize only a single chief, American and European leaders often singled 
out a particular mekko who was called mekko rakko, or “big chief.”111 
The laws issued by the Grand Council were only binding insofar as the autono-
                                                          
 103.  See, e.g., Lester Hargrett, The Creek (or Muskogee) Nation, in A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 78, 78 (1947). 
 104.  Alexander v. Gouge, 8 Okla. Trib. 1, 3 (Sup. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2003). The Court’s 
finding reflects most of the history on the matter. See, e.g., DEBO, supra note 55, at 6; Knight, supra note 92, at 
386; Lester Eugene Robbins, The Persistence of Traditional Religious Practices Among Creek Indians 88-89 
(1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Methodist University) (on file with Southern Methodist Uni-
versity). The Confederacy began meeting annually in the eighteenth century. Prior to that, there was little need 
for regular meetings. See also HUDSON, supra note 60, at 64. 
 105.  INNES ET AL., supra note 2, at 28. Some of these treaties included: Oglethorpe’s Treaty with the Lower 
Creek Indians, 4 GA. HIST. Q. 3 (1920); Treaty with Spain (Oct. 28, 1793); Treaty of Pensacola with Spain 
(1784); Treaty of Coweta with the Creeks with British (1739); Treaty with the British (1733) (signed May 21, 
ratified by British colony of Georgia, Oct. 18). It is clear that various etvlwv governments individually ap-
proved of treaties before they were ratified. When it came to one particular agreement with England, a Creek 
chief named Tomochichi traveled to England in 1734, and gave a bundle of eagle feathers to King George II, 
explaining that “these feathers are a sign of peace in our land and have been carried from town to town there 
and we have brought them over to leave with you, O Great King, as a sign of everlasting peace.” O’BRIEN, su-
pra note 61, at 120. See also CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 140; CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 
87. 
 106.  See ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 96. 
 107.  CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 69. 
 108.  MELISSA L. TATUM & MICHELLE GRUNSTED, 5 MVSKOKE LAW REPORTER  vii (Melissa L. Tatum & 
Michelle Grunsted eds., 2005); J.N.B. Hewitt, Notes on the Creek Indians, 123 SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 
BUREAU OF AM. ETHNOLOGY BULL. 119, 139-41 (1939) (The “Kings” and “Warriors” nomenclature was used 
in the 1867 Constitution); See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 109.  GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE, supra note 65, at 17. 
 110.  O’BRIEN, supra note 61, at 22-23.  
 111.  See CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 75. This position later became known as Principal 
Chief in the 1867 Constitution.   
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mous towns chose to honor them.112 This pluralistic view of law and sovereignty estab-
lishes a different set of principles than that used in the American system. American fed-
eralism is non-negotiable once states join the union.113 The centralized government does 
not allow constituent states to engage and disengage at will. Mvskoke cosmogony sees 
things differently: 
 
The cosmogony of the [Mvskoke] peoples was and is a circular one 
that makes allies of humans and nature. Therefore, the natural propen-
sity of all elements is movement in concert, but this movement implies 
no direction, linear or otherwise. In this world view, all creatures and 
events have an ab initio right to being, and a consequent right to ac-
ceptance.114 
 
The fluidity of this governmental structure was reflected in the functional structure 
of the confederacy. For example, there was no static geographic capital. The seat of the 
confederate governments rotated depending on the home etvlwv of the presiding chief.115 
Political power was largely decentralized, and local governments maintained authority 
over their own citizens. 
 
The town councils held influence over the town’s inhabitants only. The 
National Council, in contrast, made decisions for the entire body of 
Creek towns. Like the town councils, its power was minimal. Never-
theless, the European governments used it to represent the decisions of 
all the Creek people. Clearly, in many cases, it did not represent the 
desires of the common Creek people.116 
 
It is difficult to draw any conclusions about the jurisprudence of judicial decision 
makers in this time period because there are no written records other than the treaties that 
the Mvskoke leaders signed. However, given the complexity of kinship and etvlwv rela-
tionships, it is probable that those roles and duties provided some foundation for resolv-
ing structural disputes. 
                                                          
 112.  Tatum and Grunsted state:  
The pre-removal Grand Council met in the tribal towns periodically to discuss the many 
issues facing the Confederacy. Most often, the Houses met separately in one tribal square 
and then combined in an almost ritualistic ceremony to discuss what the Creek Nation 
should do in light of input from the Houses. Often, towards the end of the late 1700s, the 
Council would discuss Treaties offered by neighboring tribes and the Federal Govern-
ment. 
TATUM & GRUNSTED, supra note 108, at vii. 
 113.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 114.  WICKMAN, supra note 82, at 16–17. 
 115.  CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 71; CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 4; DEBO, supra note 55, 
at 7; GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE, supra note 65, at 18–19; HEWITT, supra note 108, at 125; DeRosier, supra 
note 56, at 73. 
 116.  H. THOMAS FOSTER II, ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE LOWER MUSKOGEE CREEK INDIANS, 1715-1836, at 16 
(2007); see also Hewitt, supra note 108, at 139-41.  
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2.  Middle Period: 1776-1811 
By the end of the eighteenth century, trade and diplomacy were still exercised in 
large part through autonomous etvlwv governments.117 After the American Revolution, 
the Creek Confederacy faced a number of new challenges.118 First, Mvskoke people had 
become increasingly reliant on trade with Europeans.119 In addition, American leaders 
began to negotiate and trade almost exclusively with red clans from red towns.120 
Whether Europeans elevated red leaders above white leaders through ignorance or strat-
egy, the practice disrupted the traditional power structure that distinguished between mil-
itary and civilian duties.121 Giving red leaders a disproportionate stake in trade created 
conflicts of interest as traditional agents of national security, while marginalizing white 
leaders’ traditional role as agents of commerce. 
This disregard for the delicate balance of powers exacerbated tensions between the 
red and white moieties.122 Disagreements among Mvskoke people about assimilation ag-
gravated these tensions and stoked the threat of civil war. Moiety divisions, once a 
source of strength and diversity for Mvskoke people, paralyzed the council during the 
early part of the nineteenth century.123 
In addition, early American government agents began to put immense pressure on 
the leaders of the Creek Confederacy to adopt the customs, economy, religion, and polit-
ical structure of Euro-Americans. Benjamin Hawkins was the first full-time federal agent 
assigned to negotiate with the Creeks in 1796.124 Hawkins sought to change Mvskoke 
life by creating a centralized government.125 He set out by abolishing the distinction be-
tween red and white towns. Under his direction, all etvlwv governments were character-
ized as “red.”126 He also began the American tradition of ignoring Mvskoke chains-of-
                                                          
 117.  HUDSON, supra note 60, at 12.  
 118.  The original Articles of Confederation did not clearly establish the relationship between the federal 
government and Indian tribes. In 1781, when the Constitution was established, Congress was explicitly given 
the authority to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 119.  Douglas Barber, Council Government and the Genesis of the Creek War, 38 ALA. REV. 163, 164 
(1985). Creek dependence on European goods such as firearms and cooking utensils began early in the seven-
teenth century and gradually weakened Creek economic power. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 32–35. 
Dependency was intentionally introduced in order to leverage land claims.  
 120.  CHAMPAGNE, supra note 54, at 113; CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 27.  
 121.  See MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 82. 
 122.  For example, when red clans controlled the actions of an etvlwv, the white clans were not able to per-
form certain peacetime ceremonies. Martin, Rebalancing the World, supra note 60, at 95-96. 
 123.  See generally Barber, supra note 119. 
 124.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 66; see generally THE COLLECTED WORKS OF BENJAMIN HAWKINS, 1796-1810 
(Thomas Foster ed., 2003). Hawkins’ office, like all Indian Affairs positions, was housed in the War Depart-
ment. Hawkins was personally selected for the role by President George Washington with a clear objective to 
“civilize” the Creek Indians. MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 87. Hawkins actually boasted that he 
created the National Council himself. ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 105. Under Hawkins’ authority, agricultural 
productivity, English language acquisition, and conversion to Christianity became priorities. Martin notes, “[i]t 
is clear that the aims and intents of the plan of civilization put into practice the expansionist policies officially 
promulgated by high government officials, including George Washington, Henry Knox, and Thomas Jeffer-
son.” MARTIN, SACRED REVOLT, supra note 54, at 94. 
 125.  Moore, supra note 78; see also ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 13 (“The plan for civilization was official 
policy, formulated by George Washington, Henry Knox, Thomas Jefferson, and other statesmen, to assimilate 
Indians into American society.”). The “hidden hand behind the plan for civilization was U.S. Expansion.” Id. at 
15; see also William W. Savage, Creek Colonization in Oklahoma, 54 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 34 (1976). 
 126.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 67; see also CHAMPAGNE, supra note 54, at 113–14. 
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command in the Confederacy and negotiating with a few select leaders. One such select 
leader was Alexander McGillivray, who served as a puppet leader under Hawkins’ con-
trol.127 Hawkins and McGillivray implemented radical changes, including “a unified for-
eign policy” and a “centralized administration”128 for the Creek Confederacy. As the 
central bureaucracy strengthened, so too did the power of the centralized government to 
enforce laws normally administered by etvlwv governments.129 For example, under the 
American-influenced Confederacy, a cultural and spiritual practice known as busketa,130 
practiced for millennia at the etvlwv level, became a national event, with the central gov-
ernment as enforcer of attendance. This action was the first recorded domestic police 
power exercised by the Confederacy.131 Hawkins also used McGillivray to manipulate 
the agenda of the National Council and prioritize activities that increased trade with 
Americans.132 
Centralizing power in a single entity was troubling to many traditional Mvskoke 
people. One of the strengths of the Creek Confederacy had been the freedom and liberty 
that its fluid structure allowed. Concentrating power in the hands of a small number of 
people ran counter to the cultural beliefs of the Mvskoke people and threatened the very 
fabric of Mvskoke society. As relations among the Mvskoke people grew strained, a 
long-standing geographical schism took on greater political overtones. The etvlwv gov-
ernments in the west (called Upper Creeks) generally advocated for a conservative per-
spective, maintaining traditional Mvskoke culture and practices, while the etvlwv gov-
ernments in the east (called Lower Creeks) supported conversion to Christianity and the 
adoption of Anglo-American practices.133 
3.  Late Period: 1811-1832 
The Upper/Lower Creek factional division ultimately resulted in a civil war, the 
Red Stick War, which lasted from 1811-1814, and left tremendous divisions within the 
Creek Confederacy.134 As part of its prosecution of the War of 1812, the British stirred 
up anti-American sentiment among Creeks and encouraged them to defy the United 
States. Upper Creeks were also heavily influenced by the Shawnee/Creek leader Tecum-
seh, who urged all tribal governments to actively resist assimilation.135 Mvskoke follow-
                                                          
 127.  CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 140–41. “McGillivray was only one-quarter Creek, for 
his mother was half-Creek and his father was full-blood Scot . . . McGillivray was, in part, a creation of the 
English and used his English connections to gain prestige and power.” Id.  
 128.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 39; PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 85.  
 129.  PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 85 (noting that in the late 1790s, “the Creeks reorganized their na-
tional council, announced laws against theft, and created a special police force to enforce them”). 
 130.  Today, colloquially referred to as Green Corn ceremonies. 
 131.  It would have been highly unusual (in most cases, forbidden) for a Mvskoke person to fail to participate 
in the annual busketa ceremony for his/her etvlwv (town). Thus, the national policy may have seemed to be 
“effective” in that people were already participating despite the national law. See John R Swanton, The Green 
Corn Dance, 10 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 170, 177–78 (1932). 
 132.  ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 105-07. 
 133.  This description is over-simplistic. For example, there were also blood quantum differences. Chaudhuri 
and Chaudhuri also suggest that “lower creeks” included more mixed-bloods than the “upper creeks”. 
CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 71. 
 134.  Barber, supra note 119. 
 135.  See, e.g., GREGORY A. WASELKOV, A CONQUERING SPIRIT: FORT MIMS AND THE REDSTICK WAR OF 
1813-1814 (2006). 
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ers of Tecumseh advocated the overthrow of leaders loyal to Benjamin Hawkins.136 
Many etvlwv governments were divided internally.137 In the end, the Lower Creeks 
aligned with the U.S. military, led by future President Andrew Jackson, and ended the 
war by slaughtering the rebellious Creeks at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend.138 The result 
was the 1814 Treaty of Fort Jackson, which included the cession of nearly two-thirds of 
Creek lands.139 
The victorious Creeks aligned more directly with U.S. agents. Americans support-
ed Lower Creek leaders, such as William McIntosh, whose father was Scottish, and who 
advocated for assimilation and acculturation. Lower Creeks also developed plantation 
economies and many became owners of African slaves.140 Despite these assimilation ef-
forts, the United States continued to demand the cession of more territory “as restitution 
for damages made to American settlers” by the Upper Creeks.141 The division between 
Upper and Lower Creeks deepened, but the Upper Creeks gradually began to gain more 
power in the 1820s. 
In 1824, the National Council began deliberations on formal national policy.142 
Encouraged by Cherokee allies, the Council declared that they would not yield any addi-
tional land to the American government.143 In addition, they explicitly rejected the notion 
of individual title to land, emphasizing the importance of communal land holdings.144 
Significantly, the Mvskoke leaders also committed laws and policies to writing, “in order 
that our chiefs may keep in mind what laws have been passed.”145 Soon, the first official 
written Mvskoke laws were hand-written in broken English by William McIntosh’s son, 
Chilly McIntosh.146 
The state of Georgia’s desire for Creek lands was relentless, despite the Creek pol-
icy statement of 1824.147 Georgia leaders enlisted the support of the U.S. Secretary of 
War in their efforts to acquire more Creek land.148 Most Mvskoke leaders refused to ne-
                                                          
 136.  GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 49–51; see also ETHRIDGE, supra note 58, at 235–39. 
 137.  See generally ETHRIDGE, supra note 58. 
 138.  The final battle in 1814, known as the Battle of Horseshoe Bend, resulted in the loss of over 3,000 
Mvskoke people (about 15 percent of the population). GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 53. 
 139.  Treaty of Fort Jackson, Aug. 8, 1814, 7 Stat. 120 (1814).  
 140.  Black chattel slavery was introduced to Mvskoke people in the mid eighteenth century by traders in 
South Carolina and Georgia. Kathryn E. Braund, The Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery, 57 J. S. HIST. 601 
(1991). 
 141.  INNES ET AL., supra note 2, at 28. 
 142.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 88. 
 143.  Id. (citing Niles’ Weekly Register, XXVIII, 225 (1824)); PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 85 (ex-
plaining that by 1824 “Georgia’s demands for the acquisition of all Creek land in the state became nearly hys-
terical.”); See also Savage, supra note 125. 
 144.  GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 59. 
 145.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 88. 
 146.  See Antonio J. Waring, Introduction, in LAWS OF THE CREEK NATION (Antonio J. Waring ed., 1960). 
 147.  In efforts to appropriate Creek lands, local non-Native officials began a public relations campaign 
which maligned the Mvskoke government. Governor Wright of Georgia declared that the Creeks “have no 
form of government or any coercive power among them.” CORKRAN, supra note 46, at 12. Other derogatory 
descriptions of early Creek government contain the same stereotypes of weak and ineffectual leadership. The 
outside observers, with a Eurocentric monarchy as their standard of governance, perceived a leader who acted 
in a specifically counselor or mediation capacity as being without power. Southern state courts also ruled in 
favor of removal. See, e.g., TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN 
JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS (2002). 
 148.  PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 85. 
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gotiate any additional land cessions, but the Georgia representatives approached William 
McIntosh and offered him a bribe in return for signing the treaty.149 McIntosh accepted 
the bribe on February 12, 1825, and signed the Treaty of Indian Springs, ceding all Creek 
lands in Alabama and Georgia in return for lands in Indian Territory.150 The Creek lead-
ers deemed this treason, and McIntosh was executed on April 30, 1825.151 Followers of 
McIntosh who intended to abide by the terms of the 1825 treaty left for Indian Territory 
almost immediately.152 The majority of the Mvskoke people, however, remained on their 
ancestral lands. 
The federal government, however, still expected all Mvskoke people to abide by 
the 1825 treaty regardless of the taint of confirmed bribery and deceit. In an effort to se-
cure better terms, several chiefs traveled to Washington, D.C. to sign a superseding trea-
ty in 1832.153 These leaders were under considerable pressure to sign another removal 
treaty, as Georgia and Alabama state officials were increasingly hostile to the continued 
presence of Indians.154 Under the terms of the 1832 treaty, the Mvskoke leaders agreed to 
sell all remaining lands in Alabama and move west to Indian Territory.155 The federal 
government promised to pay for removal and support in Indian Territory, but did not 
keep most of those promises. Significantly, the Removal Treaty did promise that the 
Mvskoke people would have the right to “perpetual self-government” in their new 
lands.156 
PART III: TRAGEDY: 1832-1867 
A.  Nene ‘Stemerketv–“The Road of Suffering” 
The history of the Mvskoke Nene ‘Stemerketv (Road of Suffering) is critical to ap-
preciating the conditions under which Mvskoke people re-constituted their governments 
in Indian Territory in the 1830s.157 The forced removal of tribal nations from the south-
                                                          
 149.  William McIntosh was to personally receive $25,000 to compensate him for ceded lands. Savage, supra 
note 125, at 39. 
 150.  Treaty with the Creeks, Feb. 12, 1825, 7 Stat. 237; see also PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 85. The 
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bama if they accepted an allotment in Alabama. Savage, supra note 125, at 41.  
 156.  Treaty with the Creeks, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366. 
 157.  We are grateful to Rosemary McCombs Maxey for explaining the Mvskoke terminology for the forced 
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eastern United States has been described as a death march which “pales in comparison” 
to the “Bataan Death March.”158 The physical devastation has been well-documented; 
less so, the cultural and political extermination that the removal initiated. The series of 
events is known—inadequately—as “The Trail of Tears,” particularly the events that be-
fell the neighboring Cherokee Nation. In all, there were dozens of trails, and while there 
were certainly tears, forced removal caused far more harm than mere sadness. 
The removal, which was organized and executed by the U.S. military, resulted in 
major disruption to the Mvskoke government. Approximately 23,000 Mvskoke people 
were forced to travel to Indian Territory by foot and riverboats. Several thousand died 
along the way.159 Re-establishing Creek government in Indian Territory was complicated 
by many factors, not the least of which were the emotional, spiritual, and physical fatigue 
of dispossession and forced relocation.160 Moreover, Upper and Lower Creeks antipa-
thies persisted during and after removal.161 Lower Creeks arrived in Indian Territory 
several years before the Upper Creeks and re-established their etvlwv system, clustered 
around the Arkansas river valley. They became known as Arkansas Creeks.162 In 1836, 
the Upper Creeks arrived (largely involuntarily) in Indian Territory and began to try to 
piece together their society, settling in the Canadian river valley about fifty miles away 
from the Lower Creeks. They became known as Canadian Creeks. The Upper Creeks and 
                                                                                                                                               
relocation that took place during this time period. 
 158.  David E. Stannard, Genocide in The Americas: Columbus’s Legacy, THE NATION 430 (1992); see also 
Milner S. Ball, John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1183 
(2000); Ethan Davis, An Administrative Trail of Tears: Indian Removal, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 49 (2008); Na-
than Goetting, The Marshall Trilogy and the Constitutional Dehumanization of American Indians, 65 GUILD 
PRAC. 207 (2008). 
 159.  Some sources suggest that up to 40 percent of Mvskoke people died on the forced journey. See, e.g., 
TANIS C. THORNE, THE WORLD’S RICHEST INDIAN: THE SCANDAL OVER JACKSON BARNETT’S OIL FORTUNE 
21 (2005) (asserting that 33-45 percent of Creek people died from disease, exposure, natural disasters, and star-
vation); see also ALEXANDER POSEY, CHINNUBBIE AND THE OWL 3 (2005). While many Mvskoke people stood 
their ground for several years, Jackson ordered the army to force remaining Mvskoke people to leave Alabama 
in 1836. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 71-72, 81-83. William Savage contemplated: 
Brigadier General Winfield Scott . . . with several thousand regular troops and volun-
teers, set out for Creek territory early in 1836. Scott’s army entrapped more than 14,500 
Creeks. Approximately 2,500 were classified as hostiles, put in chains and marched 
overland to Indian Territory. The long march lasted through the winter of 1836-1837, 
and hundreds died along the way. The survivors reached Fort Gibson in the spring of 
1837, but their arrival did not mark the end of hardship. Once in the territory, some 
3,500 Creeks died of exposure or disease. 
Savage, supra note 125, at 39. Atwood suggests that 15,000 Mvskoke members did not survive. Eleanor Patri-
cia Atwood, The Crazy Snake Rebellions: A Study in the Breakdown of Tribal Government, 15 VASSAR J. OF 
UNDERGRADUATE STUDIES 44, 45 (1942). 
 160.  Claudio Saunt, Telling Stories: The Political Uses of Myth and History in the Cherokee and Creek Na-
tions, 93 J. OF AM. HIST. 673, 687 (2006). Perdue and Green note, “[v]irtually every family in all tribes had lost 
kin.” PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 101. 
 161.  See Christopher D. Haveman, The Removal of the Creek Indians from the Southeast, 1825-1838 (Aug. 
10, 2009) (dissertation, Auburn University), available at http://etd.auburn.edu/etd/handle/10415/2184; see also 
John Bartlett Meserve, Chief Pleasant Porter, 9 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 318 (1931). Indeed, many of the Lower 
Creeks had emigrated voluntarily and selected the best lands in Indian Territory for their settlements. When the 
Upper Creeks were forced to move by the military, they arrived to find the best lands already occupied. GREEN, 
THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 44-47. 
 162.  GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 86. We know that the Lower Creeks (now known as Arkansas 
Creeks) were functioning as a unified government, because its Chief petitioned the United States to remove 
missionaries in 1836. W. Edwin Derrick, Coweta Mission: Struggle for the Mind and Soul of the Creek Indians, 
RED RIVER VALLEY HIST. REV. 4 (Winter 1979).  
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Lower Creeks operated independently for several years.163 Because of the history of dis-
trust and betrayal related to the bribery scandal and false treaty promises made by the 
U.S. government, the division between the two groups became even more volatile.164 
B.  Indian Territory 
During the remainder of nineteenth century, Mvskoke national experience was 
fraught with internal disputes, sometimes culminating in armed conflict.165 Mvskoke 
people engaged in at least three civil wars, between members favoring more progressive 
ways and those wanting to retain traditional culture and decentralized, etvlwv govern-
ments.166 It was only through perseverance that the Mvskoke people held on to political 
sovereignty. Mvskoke people managed to maintain their political identity, and yet adapt 
to changing circumstances that allowed Mvskoke self-governance to continue in spite of 
the profound trauma of removal. However, the split among the Creek people was pro-
found, implicating existential questions about national identity and cultural assimila-
tion.167 
Efforts to reunite a confederated government began in earnest within five years af-
ter removal, which was followed by the proposal of a written constitution. The Arkansas 
and Canadian Creeks formed a General Council via “pact” in 1840.168 The Council es-
tablished a place for meetings on a hill about midway between the Arkansas and Canadi-
an settlements, called Wekiwa Hulwe.169 The General Council met annually in a special-
ly constructed council house to deliberate on national matters. 
Chiefs, henehas [spiritual leaders], warriors, and medicine men, etc., still dis-
charged their official duties according to the complicated system of precedents observed 
by each individual town. In their relations with the central government, they were loosely 
classified as (1) chiefs and (2) “lawmakers” or “councilors”. Each town had a chief, one 
or two second chiefs, and from four to forty-five lawmakers.170 The chiefs and one or 
two of the lawmakers represented the town in council.171 
The Council structure reflected an intentionally divided government, with a Princi-
pal Chief for the Arkansas Creeks and a Principal Chief for the Canadian Creeks, each 
chosen by the General Council.172 Most of the focus of the Council was on external rela-
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tions, especially as it pertained to other neighboring tribal nations in Indian country. 
However, this new Council also codified criminal laws into a national uniform 
code during this era.173 Some of this national legislation was designed to enforce social 
norms and created uniform Mvskoke cultural expectations.174 For example, an 1845 na-
tional law instituted a fine for failing to attend annual etvlwv ceremonies.175 In 1855, the 
Council established a national treasury which took control of most of the treaty annuities 
that had been distributed by mekkos of the various etvlwv governments.176 The Council 
created its own supremacy doctrine, declaring that an individual etvlwv was forbidden to 
suspend a law enacted by the Council.177 
In addition, the General Council took over “main judicial functions.”178 The Coun-
cil set itself up as an appellate court, although most of the disputes were still resolved at 
the etvlwv level. The appellate process was separate from the legislative function. Debo 
explained, “[t]he creation of a separate ‘judicating commity’ illustrates a tendency the 
Council had shown since earliest times to divide according to the rank of its members 
into specialized functions.”179 The Council also dealt with matters of foreign policy, in 
particular, concerns about neighboring tribes.180 Meanwhile, American education contin-
ued to impress upon young Creeks the values of a centralized government.181 During this 
time period, the centralized government began to exercise unprecedented control over 
the etvlwv governments.182 
In 1859, the Arkansas Creek leaders actually proposed a written constitution that 
ignored the etvlwv governments as constituents, created a formal national court system, 
and required popular elections for national leadership positions.183 That constitution was 
never ratified. The Canadian Creeks (more traditional by nature) rejected the proposal 
                                                                                                                                               
CONDITION, AND PROSPECTS OF THE INDIAN TRIBES OF THE UNITED STATES COLLECTED AND PREPARED 
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS PER ACT OF CONGRESS 265-77 (1851). 
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 176.  Id. at 126. 
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 181.  See generally Saunt, supra note 160. 
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addition, civil laws were enacted to deal with increasingly complex legal disputes including horse sales, stray 
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law—for example, spouses did not inherit property, only children.  
 183.  Id. at 124–25; Hargrett, supra note 103, at 78; Robbins, supra note 104. Several scholars reference an 
1860 Constitution, although it is not clear that there were two separate documents. M. THOMAS BAILEY, 
RECONSTRUCTION IN INDIAN TERRITORY: A STORY OF AVARICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND OPPORTUNISM 14 
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pointed by the chiefs. DEBO, supra note 55, at 124. 
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because it did not provide for a role for the etvlwv governments.184 A fundamental dis-
pute about the future of the Creek Confederacy deepened, and it soon became entangled 
with the larger war beginning in the eastern United States. 
C.  United States Civil War 
Mvskoke constitutional development stalled when all tribal nations in Indian Terri-
tory were swept up in the crisis of the U.S. Civil War.185 United States troops withdrew 
in 1861, and confederate officials quickly moved in to formally occupy Indian Territo-
ry.186 Many Arkansas Creek leaders entered into treaties with the Confederacy, but 
Mvskoke people were not unified.187 The factionalism of the Arkansas and Canadian 
Creeks roughly mirrored the North and South factions of the United States, although 
clearly the differences preceded and transcended the conflict between the Union and 
Confederate states.188 More assimilated Mvskoke people tended to align with the Con-
federacy, although a significant number of slave owners also sided with the Union. 
The tension between the Loyal and Southern Creeks was as volatile and deadly as 
that between the Union and the Confederacy.189 Powerful and influential Mvskoke leader 
Opothleyahola190 advocated maintaining neutrality, but he was outnumbered by other 
leaders who wished to align with the Confederacy.191 Opothleyahola’s people, known as 
the “Loyal Creeks,” eventually fled to Kansas seeking Union troop protection.192 The 
“Southern Creeks,” who signed a Confederate treaty, maintained their form of govern-
ment throughout the war.193 The Southern Creeks even sent a delegate to the Confederate 
Congress.194 
Meanwhile, Congress passed the Indian Appropriation Act of July 5, 1862, which 
authorized the President to unilaterally abrogate treaties with tribes who had rebelled 
                                                          
 184.  PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 102. 
 185.  See Morton, supra note 63. 
 186.  Atwood, supra note 159, at 46. 
 187.  HARRING, supra note 165, at 76–77; see also Donald A. Wise, The Founding of Tulsa, 33 TULSA 
ANNALS 17 (1997). 
 188.  Green notes that “scholars have wrongly surmised that the Civil War division was a simple continuation 
of an earlier conflict. . . . In reality, Creek politics was a complicated system of shifting alignments just like that 
of the United States.” GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 96; see also John Bartlett Meserve, Chief Samuel 
Checote, with Sketches of Chiefs Locher Harjo and Ward Coachman, 16 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 401, 403 (noting 
that “the long enduring cleavage created by the tribal division into the Upper and Lower Creeks, was augment-
ed by the line up of its members during the Civil War”). 
 189.  At one point, pro-Confederate Creeks put a bounty on the heads of the pro-Union Creeks. THORNE, su-
pra note 159, at 23. 
 190.  Also spelled Opothle Yahola. This is the same Upper Creek leader who resisted removal to Indian Ter-
ritory. CHAUDHURI & CHAUDHURI, supra note 25, at 62. 
 191.  GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 90; PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 105. 
 192.  The tragic story of Opothleyahola and his followers is chronicled in LELA J. MCBRIDE, 
OPOTHLEYAHOLO AND THE LOYAL MUSKOGEE: THEIR FLIGHT TO KANSAS IN THE CIVIL WAR (2000). On their 
way to Kansas, the group was attacked on three separate occasions by Confederate Cherokee troops. The few 
survivors made it to safety in Kansas in the middle of winter. The Union troops were not present to protect 
them as had been promised. Several hundred loyal Mvskoke people froze or starved to death in southern Kan-
sas in 1862. See also PERDUE & GREEN, supra note 65, at 105–06. 
 193.  Ohland Morton, Early History of the Creek Indians, 9 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 1, 22-23 (1931). The treaty 
signed by the Confederate Creeks is discussed in the Preamble of Treaty With the Creeks, June 14, 1866, 14 
Stat. 785 (1866) (“[T]he Creeks made a treaty with the so-called Confederate States, on the tenth of July, one 
thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, whereby they ignored their allegiance to the United States”). 
 194.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 158. 
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against the United States.195 After extended post-war negotiation, Mvskoke leaders 
signed a new treaty with the United States on June 14, 1866.196 The treaty did not distin-
guish between Loyal and Confederate Creeks, and ultimately treated the entire tribe as 
rebels.197 The treaty required the Creeks to cede half of their land and to allow a railroad 
through their remaining territory.198 The treaty also approved the development of U.S. 
federal courts in Indian Territory, a provision which would later play a significant role in 
the near destruction of the Creek government.199 However, the United States reaffirmed 
some previous treaty obligations, including the promise that the United States “shall not 
in any manner interfere with or annul their present tribal organization, rights, laws, privi-
leges, and customs.”200 In short, the United States promised to respect the constitutional 
government of the Mvskoke people. 
The cessions made in the 1866 treaty were the subject of bitter controversy among 
the Mvskoke people. As such, the political and cultural divisions between the Loyal 
Creeks and the Southern Creeks continued for many years.201 Meanwhile, the local gov-
ernance structure continued to operate separately. Etvlwv mekkos and lawmakers met an-
nually to regulate internal affairs.202 
PART IV: REBUILDING: 1867-1906 
The Southern and Loyal Creeks began to work together to unify the nation, culmi-
nating in a February 1867 agreement to create a committee including representatives 
from both sides.203 This agreement laid the foundation for a unified national government. 
Indicative of the spirit of the times, a well-known Southern Creek leader, Samuel 
Checote, expressed his desire: 
 
                                                          
 195.  Indian Appropriation Act of 1871 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012)). 
 196.  Treaty with the Creeks, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785 (1866). It took nearly a year for the Loyal and Con-
federate Creek factions to agree on a treaty. Negotiations began at Fort Smith (Arkansas) shortly after Robert 
E. Lee surrendered in 1865. The treaty was signed in Washington in January 1866. GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra 
note 49, at 92-94. 
 197.  POSEY, supra note 159, at 5.  
 198.  Treaty with the Creeks, art. III, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785 (“The Creeks hereby cede and convey to the 
United States, to be sold to and used as homes for such other civilized Indians as the United States may choose 
to settle thereon, the west half of their entire domain.”) (emphasis added). When white settlers began flooding 
into Indian Territory, the Creeks argued that this provision of the treaty had been violated.   
 199.  Treaty with the Creeks, art. X, ¶ 7, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 789; see infra Part VI.B.3 for a discussion of 
the destructive role of federal courts. 
 200.  Treaty with the Creeks, art. X, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 788 (1866). In 1878, Chief Coachman explained 
the typical Mvskoke perspective of the Treaty of 1866 during his annual address:  
We were also guaranteed the right of self Government, and full jurisdiction over all 
citisens [sic]—whether native or adopted; and with a solemn agreement; that no state or 
Territory should ever pass laws for our government, and that no portion of our Territory 
should ever be embraced or included within, or annexed to any Territory or State, nor 
should any part ever be erected into a Territory, without the full and free consent of the 
legislative authority of our nation.  
Letter from Ward Coachman, Principal Chief of the Muskogee Nation, to the House of Kings and House of 
Warriors of The Muskogee Nation (Oct. 1878) (on file with the University of Oklahoma Library).  
 201.  Meserve, supra note 188, at 401; W.W. Stuckey, Last Meeting of Creek Council, THE BIXBY BULLETIN 
(1907). 
 202.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 164. 
 203.  Id. at 179. See generally GREEN, THE CREEKS, supra note 49, at 94. 
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[T]hat the Muscogee people unite and live as one Nation and those 
who were North during the late war, were not to be called Northern 
peop[le] and those who were South, were not to be Southern people; in 
short there was to be no North and no South among the Muscogee 
people but peace and friendship.204 
 
Other actions taken at the February 1867 meeting included a plan to elect a single 
principal chief in May and the appropriation of money for a new council house. Before 
the May election however, some foundational changes were made by a committee of re-
formists who sought to institute widespread assimilation through a written constitution. 
A.  1867 Constitution 
On October 12, 1867, a new constitution and code of laws for the “Muskogee Na-
tion” was unanimously adopted.205 The 1867 Constitution has since been criticized and 
blamed for myriad later problems. The drafting appears to have been entirely controlled 
by the Southern Creeks, who generally favored assimilation with American laws.206 Poor 
drafting created some problems, but longstanding disputes between the Loyal Creeks and 
Southern Creeks stymied resolution of other tensions.207 Most problematic, the Constitu-
tion was modeled after the U.S. Constitution, “instead of being shaped out of Creek 
background or political consciousness.”208 The Constitution did provide for a bicameral 
legislature which honored the role of the etvlwv governments as constituents.209  White 
                                                          
 204.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 179. To this day, Republicans are still referred to as “[t]he cold ones” - proba-
bly because their origin is in the north. See MARTIN & MCKANE MAULDIN, supra note 2, at 34 (the Mvskoke 
word for “Republicans” is este-kvsappv). Rosemary McCombs Maxey provided a helpful interpretation of this 
word. 
 205.  CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION, Oct. 12, 1867. A detailed description of the 
1867 Constitution is also available in BAILEY, supra note 183, at 109-11 (1972).  
 206.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 180. The Southern Creeks had several advantages in this process. Southern 
Creeks tended to be wealthier and more inclined to adopt American norms of behavior and law.  
 207.  One commentator noted that the Southern Creeks, “after a somewhat stormy session, framed the consti-
tution under which the affairs of the tribe were administered thereafter.” John Bartlett Meserve, Chief Ispar-
hecher, 10 CHRONS. OF OKLA. 52, 56 (1932). See also Moore, supra note 78, at 177 (explaining that that the 
1867 Constitution “was altogether so brief (five pages) and so vague that the Tribal Towns recognized it im-
mediately as a sham.”). The Mvskoke experience is not unique among tribal nations in the United States. Cor-
nell explains that Americans often “introduced governing structures that were in direct conflict with the politi-
cal traditions of the nations they were supposed to govern.” Stephen Cornell, Remaking the Tools of 
Governance: Colonial Legacies, Indigenous Solutions, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR 
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 57, 60 (Miriam Jorgenson ed., 2007). But see Meserve, supra note 161, at 
318 (“[t]he Creek constitution of 1867 may be said to be the initial gesture by the tribe toward intelligent, re-
sponsible government.”).  
 208.  MORRIS E. OPLER, REPORT ON THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY STATUS OF ASPECTS OF CREEK 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT 12 (1937). 
 209.  See generally Robbins, supra note 104. Felix Cohen, an Interior Department employee from 1933 to 
1947 who has been referred to as the father of Federal Indian Law, dismissed such bicameral tribal legislatures 
as wasteful.   
[T]here can be no justification for having two distinct legislative bodies in a single tribe. 
The extra expense; the duplication of effort when two independent bodies have to consid-
er the same matters separately; the consequent delay, friction, and inefficiency; the divid-
ed responsibility; the temptation of each house to blame the other for what goes wrong 
instead of trying to cure the wrong, all these consequences make a two-chambered legis-
lature highly inadvisable for any Indian tribe.  
FELIX S. COHEN, ON THE DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS 32 (1934). As a result, very few tribal consti-
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outsiders praised the 1867 Constitution as a hallmark of Creek civilization and frequently 
characterized opposition to the Constitution in racial terms as by “Full Bloods.”210 Eng-
lish speakers with American educations had the upper hand in drafting the 1867 Consti-
tution and were sometimes accused of misleading the traditional people about the true 
nature of the legal changes.211 One leader of the more traditional Loyal Creeks, 
Oktarharsars Harjo (also known as Sands) stated, “I wanted to make a law and told them 
to fix the old Indian law, but they made another, and when we found it out, it was the 
same as the white man’s law.”212 
The 1867 Constitution in large part mirrored the language of the U.S. Constitution. 
First, the preamble was largely lifted from that of the United States: “In order to form a 
more perfect union, establish Justice, and secure to ourselves and our children the bless-
ing of freedom and liberty, We the people of the Muskogee Nation do adopt this constitu-
tion.”213 Second, the Constitution created three separate branches of government. How-
ever, the Mvskoke Constitution provided very few enumerated powers.214 The Executive 
Branch was formalized as a branch of government with elected positions.215 The Princi-
pal Chief and Second Chief were to be popularly elected and hold office for four 
years.216 Next, the Mvskoke Constitution vested “law-making” power in a National 
Council, a bi-cameral body in which each etvlwv was entitled to one delegate in the 
House of Kings and one delegate in the House of Warriors, with an additional delegate in 
the House of Warriors for every two hundred people.217 The members of the council 
                                                                                                                                               
tutions adopted after 1934 had any kind of bicameral law-making entity. In Cohen’s haste to encourage the 
tribes to adopt unicameral legislatures as more efficient, the traditional role of the bicameral approach for many 
tribal cultures was overlooked. 
 210.  See, e.g., The Creek Nation: A Settlement of their Troubles Effected—Samuel Checote Declared Chief, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1871, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=F10F13FF395515768FDDAA0A94D8415B818BF0D3; see also Creek Nation Advances, 
MCINTOSH COUNTY DEMOCRAT 2 (1974).  
 211.  A Constitution based on the U.S. model was an affront to Mvskoke people who maintained traditional 
value systems. Duane Champagne, Remaking Tribal Constitutions, in AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 11, 15 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006) (“the values underlying 
the U.S. Constitution often are at odds with the values and institutional relations of most Native traditions.”). 
 212.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 182. 
 213.  See CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION (1867). 
 214.  Substantive enumerated powers were codified in statute (e.g., appointment power, Ch. 1., Sec. 5 
(1880)). Separation of powers also manifested itself in the architecture for the new nation’s capitol building. 
When a new Council House was built in 1878, the building contained three separate chambers for the three 
branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial. Brochure, Creek Council House Museum 10 (on 
file with the author). The Council House still stands today in downtown Okmulgee, Oklahoma. The structure 
was sold to the city of Okmulgee in 1919, and has served as a museum since that time. In 2010, the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation repurchased this historical building for $3.2 million. See Sara Plummer, Tribe Regains Historic 
Council House, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 15, 2010, 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/site/aspx?articleid=20101115_11_A13_CUTLIN80706.  
 215.  See generally CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION (1867). 
 216.  See id. at art. II, § 1. Voting was limited to male citizens over the age of 18. This was a change from 
earlier Mvskoke government schemes in which the Principal Chief would be selected by the Kings and Warri-
ors.  
 217.  See id. at art. I. Towns were also mentioned explicitly in the statutory law. For example, towns served 
as the polling places for national elections. See id. ch. IX, art. I. Recall that the early “Grand Council” specified 
that Warriors would come from red clans and Kings would come from white clans. See supra note 108 and 
accompanying text. No specification of those roles was made in the text of the constitution. Thus it appears, at 
least from the text, that a traditional government structure was replaced by an American-style representational 
government. 
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were also elected for four-year terms.218 Although the Constitution called for these repre-
sentatives to be elected by popular vote, the intent was that each etvlwv government 
would send its mekko to serve in the House of Kings. The House of Warriors was more 
of a typical representative government, with larger etvlwv governments being allowed 
more seats in the legislature than smaller etvlwv governments.219 All laws passed by the 
both houses of the Council were to be approved by the Principal Chief.220 The Principal 
Chief had veto power which could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Council.221 
The new structure was implemented swiftly. The first election governed by the 
new Constitution was held in November, less than one month after the Constitution was 
approved and most traditional people, largely made up of Loyal Creeks, were unable to 
attend and vote.222 The pro-assimilation movement, largely made up of Southern Creeks, 
was thus able to take political control of the new Nation. Samuel Checote, a primary ar-
chitect of the constitution, became the first Principal Chief. In January 1868, the new 
court system was initiated in several districts.223 Later that year, a Council House was 
completed and the new seat of the nation was called Okmulgee.224 The first task of this 
legislative body was to work on criminal laws, civil and criminal procedure rules, the 
imposition of taxes on cattle drives through tribal lands, and the process for approving 
settlement by non-Natives.225 The final part of implementing the 1867 Constitution was 
the creation of the Supreme Court, which was also established without any participation 
from a majority of the Loyal Creek people.226 
The Sands faction continued to work toward repealing the constitution and return-
ing to the old laws: 
 
[t]he Indians of the Anti-Government element looked upon the adop-
tion of the white man’s institutions with disfavor. They seemed to de-
                                                          
 218.  Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1120 (D.C. 1976). 
 219.  The creation of new towns was prohibited by statutory law. CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE 
NATION (1867) ch. 12. art. VIII. 
 220.  Id. art. II, § 4. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Opler, supra note 62, at 166-70. 
 223.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 184-85. Article III of the 1867 Constitution established the “high court” (a 
phrase that quickly fell into disuse in favor of “Supreme Court”). Section 1 provided the “supreme law-defining 
power in this nation shall be lodged in a high court.” CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION (1867) art. 
III, § 1. However, Section 2 limits the power of the high court to “all cases where the issue is for more than one 
hundred dollars ($100).” Id. § 2. The five judges of the Supreme Court were chosen by the National Council at 
its annual session. The judges had to be at least twenty-five years old and a “competent recognized citizen of 
the Muskogee [Creek] Nation.” Id. Article IV established six local judicial districts, each to be “furnished with 
a judge, a prosecuting attorney, and a company of light horsemen [law enforcement].” Id. art. IV, § 1. The con-
stitution set forth the process for choosing judges, the power to summon juries, and other logistical matters. See 
id. art. IV. However, there was no codified appellate procedure. Indeed, a plain reading of the text would sug-
gest that the Article IV trial courts had far more authority and power than the Article III high court. However, it 
appears that very few final decisions from these Article IV trial courts were appealed to the Supreme Court. 
 224.  Okmulgee remains the capital of the Creek Nation today. 
 225.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 188. The Council adopted both domestic and foreign laws. In addition to 
providing appropriations for various government activities, such as education, the Council entered into interna-
tional compacts agreements with other tribes. See, e.g., Ohland Morton, Reconstruction in the Creek Nation, 9 
CHRONS. OF OKLA 171, 173 (1931).  
 226.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 185. For example, one of the Loyal Creeks, Cotchoche, was offered a seat on 
the Supreme Court but declined to serve. Id. 
150 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:123 
sire the conditions of society and government that existed prior to the 
removal of the Creeks to Indian Territory, and this element followed 
those who would promise government of that nature.227 
 
After an armed standoff, the two factions came together to resolve their differences 
under the guidance of the local Indian agent. In the end, most of the traditional people 
honored their promise to work within the auspices of the written Constitution of 1867.228 
However, the truce was only temporary. The development of the 1867 Constitution 
and the subsequent schism was the first instance of what would become a recurring pat-
tern over the next 150 years. Some elements of Mvskoke society have desired more cul-
tural and political assimilation, while other elements of Mvskoke society retain their pre-
colonial ways, operating a traditional etvlwv government in the shadows.229 This shadow 
government became a key factor in the 1979 federal decision, upholding the 1867 Con-
stitution. It is ironic that the shadow government of the traditional Creek would ultimate-
ly save the constitution written by the assimilationist Creeks. However, a “prolonged 
constitutional struggle” ensued.230 The Muscogee Supreme Court weighed in on several 
of these disputes. 
B. Muscogee Supreme Court 
This section examines three nineteenth century Muscogee Supreme Court opinions 
which helped to shape the constitutional structure of the nation.231 As noted earlier, the 
1867 Constitution provided very few enumerated powers for the court systems. Two dif-
ferent articles established two separate court systems, and no appellate structure was ar-
ticulated.232 
In addition to having no clear appellate authority, there was also no textual basis 
for judicial review, and thus no clear basis for overturning actions of the legislative 
and/or executive branches. The U.S. Supreme Court resolved this issue in 1803 when it 
                                                          
 227.  BAILEY, supra note 183, at 118. 
 228.  Green explains, “[a]fter every great civil conflict, it was characteristic of [Mvskoke] political maturity 
to reach some sort of agreement, to forgive one another and, to reunite.” GREEN, THE CREEK PEOPLE, supra 
note 65, at 76. 
 229.  Sidney Harring explains, “[t]here can be no question that a traditional law, invisible to whites, func-
tioned alongside the formal legal institutions of the Indian nations, a set of legal institutions adopted by the 
elected National Councils and based on American law.” Sidney L. Harring, Crazy Snake and the Creek Strug-
gle for Sovereignty: The Native American Legal Culture and American Law, 34 AM. J. OF LEGAL HISTORY 
365, 370 (1990). 
 230.  See, e.g., 1870 REPORT OF THE COMM’R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: CREEK AGENCY, INDIAN TERRITORY, at 2. 
There still exists some little trouble between the legal government and the Sands faction, 
which is being augmented by Sands visiting Washington and returning with long stories 
and promises, which are told as coining [sic] from the Government, and which create dis-
sension and strife, resulting frequently in open rebellion against the constitutional au-
thorities. 
 231.  The contemporary (post-1979) Muscogee (Creek) Nation Supreme Court sometimes cites to these opin-
ions, even though they are cases interpreting the 1867 Constitution, which is no longer the governing docu-
ment. See, e.g., Ellis v. Nat’l Council, 9 Okla. Trib. 190 (Sup. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2006) (cit-
ing Muscogee Nation v. Tiger, 1 Mvs. L. Rep. 8 (1885)).   
 232.  In fact, there was separate attorney admission for the district courts and the supreme courts. CONST. 
AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION chapter XII, art. VII. 
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decided Marbury v. Madison.233 However, that decision pre-dated the Creek Constitution 
and was not binding precedent, as it emanated from a foreign government.234 Thus, the 
new Supreme Court encountered many of the same issues that arose in the early years of 
the United States, when inter-branch disputes threatened the constitutional structure. The 
major role of the Supreme Court in these disputes was to answer inquiries from the Prin-
cipal Chief and/or the National Council on the constitutionality of existing or proposed 
legislation.235 Court records do not reveal any type of formal constitutional litigation—
thus the constitutional jurisprudence from this time period emerges in the form of adviso-
ry opinions.236 
These three opinions analyzed below suggest that the Mvskoke judiciary, like the 
legislative and executive branches, was officially proceeding as an assimilated Ameri-
can-style government.237 While it is possible that the justices were considering traditional 
Mvskoke government principles, none of the opinions mentions the role of the etvwlv 
governments, clans, or division of power between the red and white polities. The justices 
of the Supreme Court were clearly influenced by the dominant Anglo-American legal 
culture.238 While the justices themselves did not have law degrees from American law 
schools, they probably interacted with Anglo-American lawyers and government agents 
frequently. 
During the time period in which these decisions were written, the etvwlv govern-
ments continued to be the “most important unit of collective life” despite the fact that its 
power was not included in the written constitution and the Supreme Court never men-
tioned them in its constitutional law decisions from this era.239 Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s earliest opinions show a marked deviation between how Creek people tradition-
ally governed themselves and how the new, assimilated Supreme Court was applying the 
American-style constitution. Arguably, the court sought to bolster its legitimacy of the 
                                                          
 233.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175 (1803).  
 234.  Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).  
 235.  In 1878, the Supreme Court ruled that it would not issue advisory opinions based on the petition of in-
dividuals, but only upon referral from the executive or legislative branch. Smith v. Adams, 7 Mvs. L. Rep. 270 
(Sup. Ct. of the Muskogee (Creek) Nation 1878).   
 236.  While the United States Supreme Court does not issue so-called “advisory opinions” (see, e.g., Hay-
burn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792)), the nineteenth century Muscogee Supreme Court did offer constitutional opin-
ions on matters that were not in active, adversarial litigation.  
 237.  Speeches given by Mvskoke (Creek) leaders in the same time period also reflect an understanding that 
the Mvskoke people were governed by an American-style three-branch government. For example, in 1883, 
Chief Perryman explained the limited role of the executive branch in his inaugural address, using language sim-
ilar to that used to espouse the genius of the American Constitution: 
If the genius of the Muskogee [Creek] government contemplated intrusting [sic] the care 
of their interests of the people to the Chief alone; if it were left to him alone to furnish 
the wisdom necessary to plan and develop the ways and means to secure the greatest 
good to the greatest number of [Creek] citizens, my case might indeed seem discourag-
ing, but this is not so, and it is a matter for congratulation that we are all favored with a 
government republican in form, where no monarch rules, but where government is the 
immediate outgrowth of the people themselves. 
J.M. Perryman, Principal Chief of Muskogee Nation, Inaugural Message to the National Council (Dec. 5, 
1883). 
 238.  L.C. Perryman, Principal Chief of Muskogee Nation, Annual Message to National Council (Oct. 11, 
1888) (“[w]e cannot make jurists of our judges in one nor in five years”). 
 239.  DEBO, supra note 55, at 291. 
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court in the eyes of American lawyers and outside forces.240 This poses the question of 
whether the court sacrificed its internal legitimacy and relevance of the court itself, or 
whether this was part of a more concerted effort to shield the internal politics of the 
Creek nation from outside interference. In these cases, the court demonstrated its inde-
pendence from powerful interest groups within the tribe.241 The court found in favor of 
the assimilationist interests and against the more traditional factions within the tribe.242 
And in the preferred warrant case, the court demonstrated its independence from the 
members of the tribal council who were arguably the wealthy power-brokers of that 
era.243 
1.  Permit cases (1875 and 1884) 
The legislation which triggered the development of a Mvskoke judicial review 
principle relates to a set of facts implicating both cultural and legal assimilation. In hand-
written advisory opinions, the Supreme Court twice declared acts of Council unconstitu-
tional during the late nineteenth century. These opinions (one from 1875 and one from 
1884) are the earliest examples of written Mvskoke constitutional jurisprudence.244 
The laws struck down by the Supreme Court were bans on most forms of white 
settlement and employment.245 Following the Civil War, illegal white settlers began 
flooding into Indian Territory, causing considerable anxiety for all tribal governments.246 
It was difficult for tribal nations to control the behavior and settlement of squatters—
unscrupulous characters who sought to profit from perceived legal ambiguity in the set-
tlement of tribal lands.247 Legislative efforts to protect Creek land from illegal settlement 
began in the first Council session, and remained a high priority in every recorded session 
of the National Council until 1906.248 The Council initially established a permit system 
to ensure that any white settlers or laborers were of noble character and had local refer-
ences.249 It appears that this permit system did not address the crisis of illegal settle-
                                                          
 240.  See generally, HARRING, supra note 165, at 82, 100-05 (explaining that the constitutional legal order 
was an attempt to strike “accommodation with the United States, which respected only legal institutions resem-
bling its own”). 
 241.  See generally id. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  See W.F. McIntosh, Preferred Warrants Unlawful, MUSKOGEE PHOENIX, June 12, 1895. 
 244.  DEBO supra note 55, at 215-16. Debo describes the opinion as “labored” and “forced” and suggests that 
the Supreme Court was simply adopting the norms and values of the United States. Id. 
 245.  See infra notes 247-77 and accompanying text. 
 246.  Atwood, supra note 159, at 46. The Creek Council passed at least 20 statutes over a 30 year period to 
try to deal with illegal actions of white settlers. In 1937, a Mvskoke elder explained, "[t]here were too many 
white people coming into the Indian Territory to even think that the Indians could keep on with the tribal laws." 
Interview with Daniel Starr, in Henryetta, Okla. (Oct. 18, 1937). 
 247.  Atwood, supra note 159, at 46 (“[i]n twenty years, the white element composed two thirds of the popu-
lation”); see also BAILEY, supra note 183, at 124. 
 248.  HARRING, supra note 165, at 91 (describing these measures as “sound and sensible measures promoted 
by traditional Creeks.”). 
 249.  CONST. AND LAWS OF THE MUSKOGEE NATION ch. 7, Art. 4, § 1 (1880). Even spouses and parents of 
Creek citizens were required to obtain a government permit to remain with their families. Id. at art. III, §§ 1-2 
(statute indicates spouses and parents of Muskogee citizens would have a right to live in the nation, “provided 
that such person shall satisfy the Principal Chief as to their good character and honest intentions, and provided 
that the Principal Chief shall grant to such person permit to reside in the Nation during good behavior”). 
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ment.250 Because of continuous problems in controlling white men and a general distrust 
of the actions of white speculators and laborers, there was considerable pressure to com-
pletely outlaw all white labor.251 Thus, in 1875, the Council passed an act which repealed 
the permit system, and criminalized the employment of any “United States citizen” with-
in Creek territory.252 
However, many wealthier Mvskoke ranchers sought to re-establish plantation-style 
agriculture and needed white laborers.253 These plaintiffs usually complained to the ex-
ecutive branch that the acts of Council violated the 1867 Constitution.254 This tension 
resulted in an extended debate about legislative authority, which lasted nearly nine (9) 
years.255 The debate began almost immediately. When Lochar Harjo was elected Princi-
pal Chief just a few months after the permit system was abolished (thus banning em-
ployment of U.S. citizens), he advocated for a reinstatement of the permit system.256 His 
inaugural address included strong language that the permit system should be re-
established so that United States citizens could once again be employed in the nation.257 
When the Council failed to act on Harjo’s proposal, he asked the Muscogee Supreme 
Court to review the constitutionality of the ban on white laborers.258 
The 1875 opinion is basically a line-by-line interpretation of the Muscogee Consti-
tution preamble, which essentially mirrored that of the United States.259 From a modern 
perspective, it is curious that the opinion only reviews language from the preamble, and 
does not examine any other section of the constitution.260 There are at least two ways to 
interpret this choice. Perhaps, given the dearth of American-educated lawyers in the 
Creek nation, the Supreme Court focused on the concepts found in the more accessible 
language of the preamble rather than the legalistic language found in the body of the 
1867 Constitution. Another possible reason that the court focused only on the preamble 
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was that the Mvskoke approach to governance had been one that valued principles and 
philosophy over technicalities. 
The court began by drawing a clear line between the word “justice” and the con-
cept of “right” when it stated: 
 
The first and second clauses of the preamble ‘In order to form a more 
perfect union and establish  justice,’ asserts and proclaims civilization, 
and the privilege of exercising common right—[giving] rights and Jus-
tice to whom they are due—They speak of Justice, and what is Justice 
but an instrument commanding, extending and protecting that which is 
right.261 
 
Next, the court explained that an individual has a “common right” to say “who 
shall cultivate his soil or perform any kind of labor, for a fair compensation.”262 The 
permit legislation, which banned the employment of U.S. citizens, thus was “intruding 
upon this right.”263 Therefore, the court concluded that the legislation violated the second 
clause of the preamble (the Establishment of Justice Clause).264 The court did not stop 
with the Establishment of Justice Clause. Next, it considered the third clause: “Securing 
to ourselves and our children the blessings of freedom.”265 The court noted that “Free-
dom is liberty” and used the same logic it used in analyzing the word “Justice” to con-
clude that the Mvskoke people have liberty “to perform any duty that is our personal in-
terest and advantage if the performance of such duty does not interfere with the rights 
and interests of others.”266 
This 1875 advisory opinion thus established individual liberties and rights as the 
centerpiece of the Muscogee Constitution. Concerns about the welfare of the Muscogee 
Nation as a collective is not apparent in this interpretive scheme. There is no mention of 
possible harm to the Nation as a result of intruders, even though that was what the debate 
really centered upon. In the end, the court referred to the rights of individuals to employ 
citizens of the United States as “sacred liberty” and found legislation to the contrary to 
be “unconstitutional, null [and] void and of no effect . . . .”267 The advisory opinion did 
not permanently halt the controversy over the employment of U.S. citizens. In 1878, a 
short civil war erupted within the Creek nation.268 Known as the “Green Peach” war, it 
was prompted by both political differences and frequent criminal acts committed by 
white men.269 
A review of acts passed by the Council in the 1880s suggests that illegal settlers 
continued to use every mechanism—from brute force to fraud—to acquire land. The 
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Council passed a multitude of laws to engage with the federal government to banish in-
truders permanently from Creek lands. As the situation became more desperate, the 
Creek Council again began to put new restrictions on white labor. A new permit system 
was passed in October 1884, and the Supreme Court was asked to weigh in on the con-
troversial topic once again.270 However, the court offered the same analysis and ruling 
that had been established in the 1875 advisory opinion. The court began by exploring the 
genesis of the 1867 Constitution, which stated “[t]he Muscogees found that the rights of 
the people of other nations were carefully guarded by a paramount law called a constitu-
tion over which neither Chief nor council could pass and, which unlike everything the 
Muscogee [Creek] had, was an effective safeguard to the rights of the people.”271 
Next, the court codified the doctrine of checks and balances by concluding that the 
constitution guarded against the violation of rights “by a reckless council or the usurpa-
tion of an ambitious Chief.”272 This is the doctrine of judicial review—the court can 
strike down unconstitutional laws and policies of the other two branches of govern-
ment.273 
Finally, the court definitely ruled that taxation and other laws which burdened 
Creek employers of U.S. citizens were unconstitutional: “Any law which prohibits our 
citizens from employing foreign laborers working and utilizing the natural resources of 
our country, or which by taxation or otherwise will so burden and obstruct the use of the 
same, must in the [judgment] of this court be [unconstitutional].”274 
These permit opinions were also decided during the same period that the U.S. fed-
eral courts were beginning to establish the jurisprudence of substantive due process.275 
While no American cases were cited by the Supreme Court, several significant American 
cases were issued in the same decade as the employment permit cases, and those cases 
emphasize the importance of keeping a check on government regulations that serve to 
limit activity of businesses.276 Neither of the opinions mentions nor endorses the role of 
etvlwv governments in making decisions about employment. It is possible that etvlwv 
leaders, who may not have considered the court opinion binding, continued to exercise 
decision-making about these kinds of issues at the local level. 
2.  Preferred Warrant Case (1895) 
While the Supreme Court’s opinion in the 1895 Preferred Warrants case is not 
particularly complex, the underlying facts demonstrate how the internal struggles of the 
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various government branches continued an internal struggle for power. This case impli-
cated Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1867 Constitution, which stated, “[n]o laws taking 
effect upon things that occurred before the enactment of the law shall be passed.”277 The 
National Council passed an act in 1893 which gave its members holding warrants a pri-
ority, or preference in payments, thus making it more likely that council members would 
be paid if total funds were insufficient to make all investors whole.278 Acting Principal 
Chief, Edmond Bullet, referred the matter to the Supreme Court and in June 1895, Chief 
Justice W.F. Grayson issued an advisory opinion, which appeared in the “Muscogee 
Phoenix” newspaper.279 
This controversy arose during a particularly vulnerable economic time for all 
Mvskoke people. Oklahoma became a territory by act of Congress in 1890.280 The feder-
al Indian policy of allotment was already underway in most of the United States, and the 
federal government was attempting to pass similar legislation to impact the Creek, Semi-
nole, Chickasaw, Cherokee, and Choctaw Nations.281 Settlers and speculators understood 
that acquiring interest in large amounts of land would prove lucrative in the event of al-
lotment. Wealthy Creek leaders, too, took advantage of this potential opportunity. Some 
council members apparently took advantage of this knowledge to pass a preferential law 
for themselves, but the executive and judicial branches managed to prevent its enforce-
ment—the executive by querying the court, and the court by declaring the law unconsti-
tutional.282 
The short opinion offers two different lines of analysis: First, the court said that the 
legislation was “violative of good faith” without mentioning a particular constitutional 
provision;283 second, the law was found to contravene Article VIII, Section 2, because 
the preferred status of council members’ warrants was retroactive.284 While there is no 
specific mention of traditional Mvskoke governing principles, the decision is likely con-
sistent with traditional governance principles of fairness.285 In the early days of the Creek 
Confederacy, etvwlv leaders would likely have been rebuked for an inequitable distribu-
tion of resources, especially if they kept wealth for themselves. 
This era of constitutional jurisprudence came to an end with the Oklahoma Land 
Rush.286 We will never know how the Creek Nation would have developed because the 
Supreme Court was abolished by the end of 1906, via federal law.287 Despite the Creek 
Nation’s best efforts to maintain control over its treaty lands, the Nation fell victim to the 
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power of the U.S. government and the economic power of industry.288 United States ex-
pansion, bolstered by the manifest destiny philosophy, left the Creek Nation unable to 
sustain its resistance to exclusive authority over its land and people.289 
PART V: SURVIVAL: 1906-1976 
As federal power intensified near the end of the nineteenth century, Mvskoke con-
stitutional development stalled yet again.290 The United States adopted a new policy in 
dealing with tribal governments that would see the Creek Nation’s reservation sold out 
from underneath them.291 Allotment and statehood were new tools created by the United 
States to seize more land throughout the United States—with the ultimate goal to termi-
nate collective land holdings and governments of tribal nations.292 However, the 1867 
Constitution never fully ceased to operate as a governing document for many Mvskoke 
people. This section explains how the 1867 Constitution survived this tumultuous period. 
A.  Allotment and Statehood 
Allotment was a nationwide federal policy designed to extinguish tribal ties and 
create individual landowners of Indian people.293 Unilateral legislation (which often ab-
rogated clear treaty provisions) created various federal commissions, which assigned 
small, farm-sized plots of lands to individual Indians.294 Whatever land remained after 
allotment was considered “surplus” and thus opened to non-Indian settlers.295 The Gen-
eral Allotment Act “had disastrous effects on tribes and reservation life.”296 The initial 
allotment laws specifically exempt the “Five Civilized Tribes” of Indian Territory.297 But 
only a few years passed before political pressure to dissolve the Five Civilized Tribes 
began. 
Congress set the stage for usurpation of Indian Territory tribal lands and authority 
by establishing a new federal court in Indian Territory in 1889.298 Attorney Susan Work 
explains that congressional strategy took two forms: “First, threaten the tribes with aboli-
tion of their courts . . . or second, actually abolish the tribal governments, so that tribal 
consent to allotment would not be required.”299 
The Muscogee Nation, along with the other southeastern tribal nations in Indian 
Territory, actively resisted this policy to prevent the tribal lands from being divided.300 In 
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1893, the National Council even ordered a new constitution to be drafted.301 The very 
first article of that draft constitution staked a strong constitutional claim against allot-
ment: 
 
The lands of the Muskogee [Creek] Nation shall remain the common 
property of the recognized citizens thereof share and share alike; and 
the national council may by law prescribe such regulations for the in-
dividual use thereof as it shall deem wise and proper; provided always, 
that no law or laws shall be enacted individualizing the fee in soil.302 
 
For unknown reasons, the 1893 “New Constitution” was never ratified. However, 
the Creek Council formally opposed the policy of allotment through a series of resolu-
tions.303 By 1896, the Council again completely banned white labor and non-Creek land 
ownership (despite two Supreme Court opinions finding that such laws were unconstitu-
tional.)304 Clear desperation was evident by 1897, when Council passed a law requiring 
the Principal Chief to travel to Washington, D.C., and personally plead with the Secre-
tary of Interior to remove “all intruders . . . at once.”305 
In the meantime, Congress had grown impatient with the stalling actions of the In-
dian Territory tribes and passed the Curtis Act in 1898.306 “This law unilaterally abol-
ished the tribal court systems of the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw and Chickasaw nations” 
and mandated allotment of the tribal lands.307 To ensure the Tribes could not respond 
through legislative action, the Act required all tribal legislation to be approved by the 
President of the United States.308 
The Curtis Act offered lip service to tribal self-determination by allowing tribal 
governments to “negotiate” agreements for the disposal of tribal lands.309 However, the 
Creek Nation refused to make any agreement, and the implementation of the Curtis Act 
began in 1900.310 In 1901, principal Creek leaders caved under federal pressure and en-
tered into an “agreement” which allowed the federal government to distribute Creek 
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land.311 Other Creek leaders sought to prevent the destruction of tribal sovereignty and 
self-determination, but were stymied by federal opposition.312 
Meanwhile, the white population in Oklahoma Territory had been organizing its 
statehood petition for years.313 Creek leaders collaborated with four other tribes in an ef-
fort to avoid white-controlled statehood.314 The Creek Council had formally opposed 
statehood as early as 1893,315 but the last few months of effort involved a comprehensive 
attempt to petition for an Indian-controlled state. 
  The six months’ leeway between October 1905 and March 1906, did not, howev-
er, represent a bungled attempt at punctuality on their part. Instead, it was lead-time to 
coordinate the actions of four of the five “Civilized Tribes.”316 Further, “[j]oining to-
gether, the Muscogee, Cherokee, Choctaw, and Seminole undertook to form the Native 
State of Sequoyah, the name suggested by Chinnubbie Harjo in honor of the great Cher-
okee syllabicist, Sequoyah.”317 
Congress refused to consider the statehood efforts of the Indian Territory tribal na-
tions.318 Instead, Oklahoma became the forty-sixth state of the United States in 1907.319 
The combination of the Curtis Act and Oklahoma statehood resulted in a wholesale liq-
uidation of the Creek Nation (at least as recognized by the federal government).320  The 
demise of the “Five Tribes” was eulogized by sentimental journalists with headlines such 
as “The Five Civilized Tribes Passing Away”—thus solidifying the dominant society’s 
belief that the tribal governments had been dissolved.321 Indian people who cooperated 
with allotment were given 160 acres each, and the intent was for them to assimilate into 
mainstream American life, thus eliminating the need for a separate tribal government.322 
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For at least a decade (one might argue longer), one faction of Mvskoke people 
openly defied the federal government and continued to operate as though the Curtis Act 
was non-binding.323 They also refused to accept allotments.324 This dissenting faction of 
traditional Mvskoke people, led by a man named Chitto Harjo (Crazy Snake), attempted 
to sustain the constitutional government despite the actions of the United States.325 De-
claring the Curtis Act null and void for Creek people, since it violated the 1832 and 1866 
treaties, the Snake faction simply reinstated the national Creek government.326 
The fact that the so-called “Snakes” adopted the same system of governance 
demonstrates that the 1832 and 1866 treaties, as well as the 1867 Constitution, continued 
to have value and meaning to many Mvskoke people. While popular press from the dom-
inant culture characterized the Snake faction as typical violent Native outlaws, other his-
torical sources suggest that the rebel government actually maintained peace and civili-
ty.327  
 
As for the Snake faction in general, their meetings had been peaceful. 
They had never molested or intimidated any person who stopped or 
passed by during a council meeting. Chitto Harjo, while telling his 
people that their land would be restored to be held in common as in the 
old days of the Creek Nation, had nevertheless cautioned them not to 
violate the law.328 
 
Harjo’s actions, of course, were in direct violation of the many agreements and 
concessions made by the elected Mvskoke leaders in the early twentieth century and his 
government officials were labeled traitors with Chief Porter requesting assistance from 
the U.S. military to quash the so-called rebellion.329 Many leaders of Harjo’s government 
were captured in 1901, and pled guilty in federal court to charges of seditious conspira-
cy.330  The pleading explains the perspective of Harjo’s group: 
 
We state that as citizens of the Creek nation we have been opposed to 
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the abolition of our courts by any act of congress and to any change in 
our tribal form of government, and that in October, 1900, we met to-
gether and agreed to form a government of our own, with a full com-
plement of officers, including a judicial system, with a principal chief 
and a second chief and a cabinet composed of twelve members.331 
 
After a sympathetic federal judge lectured the prisoners and then allowed them to 
return home (on condition that they abandon their efforts to organize), the Snakes simply 
continued to govern themselves.332 Harring explains “it is clear that the traditional coun-
cils simply moved from Hickory Ground and continued their government wherever they 
could meet.”333 Another armed stand-off occurred in 1909, which left the Harjo band 
scattered and weakened, although not altogether extinguished.334 Mvskoke people main-
tained their traditional town councils, even if they could not operate openly as a govern-
ment. 
Another allied group of people who resisted allotment, statehood, and the destruc-
tion of Creek government, was the Four Mothers Society, which included women from 
the Creek, Cherokee, and Chickasaw nations.335 The Four Mothers Society continued to 
educate their community members about the nature of the governments of the tribal na-
tions. Mvskoke literary scholar Craig Womack explains the significance of these efforts: 
 
The Snake and Four Mothers position was that even if no one else on 
the face of the earth recognized Creek government, if, in fact, the only 
place Creek government was recognized was inside the imaginations of 
Creeks who refused the death of their dreams and the meaning of con-
stitutional law in a civilized society, such an imagining was still of ut-
most importance to their future.336 
 
The successor groups of people sustained the 1867 Constitutional style government 
and local town councils throughout a tumultuous twentieth century during which their 
authority was challenged by both internal and external forces. 
B.  Twentieth Century Struggles 
The Mvskoke constitutional system between 1906 and 1976 is not well-
documented.337 Immediately before Oklahoma statehood, in 1906, Congress passed a 
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 337.  In 1978, the United States Court of Appeals noted that "the Creek National Council per se has not met 
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law which acknowledged the continued existence of the five tribes (including the Creek 
Nation) until the allotment and property distribution process was completed.338 While the 
intent of Congress may have been to give Oklahoma authorities a few more years to 
complete the paperwork of termination, this law was the critical piece of evidence that 
led a federal court, sixty years later, to determine that the federal recognition of the 1867 
Creek Constitution had never been extinguished.339 This was not the official position of 
the United States, however, and between 1906 and 1976, the U.S. government dealt with 
Mvskoke people as a former tribe without any constitutional authority or any right to 
self-determination.340 After statehood, the Creek Nation, like many tribes, continued to 
exist as a nation unto itself, although the United States only recognized the role of Prin-
cipal Chief, who was appointed by the President of the United States.341 
Some documents exist in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation historical archives and var-
ious historical repositories throughout Oklahoma, but there are few formally-published 
Creek government documents from this time period. Local newspapers throughout Okla-
homa document the story of a Creek Council which continued to function as a confeder-
ated government. A group known as the “Creek Convention” began meeting in 1909.342  
The body was comprised of leaders from various etvlwv governments and continued to 
operate as a sovereign entity with domestic and foreign powers.343 Few records document 
the activities of this body, but the 1976 federal court decision describes the Convention 
as “the successor in function to the National Council.”344 Local newspapers document 
periodic meetings,345 but also reflect the dominant society’s view that the government 
had no legitimate power. The Council met in 1921 and elected a chief, although a re-
gional newspaper declared the title to be “purely honorary”.346 
Etvlwv governments continued to operate independently, but little documentation 
is publically available.347 In 1936, Congress passed the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 
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when the Creek Tribal Towns were queried in 1937 about whether they wished to be 
recognized and chartered by the United States government, the Mvskoke leaders re-
sponded that they considered it improper for a junior political entity to solicit a senior 
one, and offered instead to negotiate the recognition of the United States by the Tribal 
Towns. 
 
Moore, supra note 78, at 164. 
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which provided authorization for tribal governments in Oklahoma to establish constitu-
tional governments, which would be recognized by the federal government.348 A local 
newspaper reported later that year that a constitutional committee of Creek people was 
meeting in Okmulgee, but it does not appear that a constitution was ultimately ratified.349 
Three etvlwv governments (Thlopthlocco, Kialegee and Alabama-Quassarte) inde-
pendently created constitutions in the 1930s and received the approval of the Secretary of 
the Interior.350 In recognizing these tribal towns, the federal government put its imprima-
tur on etvwlv rule, documenting the longevity of local governance among the Mvskoke 
people. Yet the larger Muscogee Nation itself remained essentially unrecognized by the 
federal government. In 1944, twenty-four town leaders convened to draft a new constitu-
tion, “but it was never approved by the Secretary of the Interior.”351 The Council contin-
ued to meet semi-regularly, although the federal government considered this Council as 
serving in a mere advisory capacity during the mid-twentieth century.352 
In 1951, the newly-appointed Principal Chief, John Davis, drew a line the sand 
when it came to the National Council.353 He refused to recognize the Council, declaring 
that “the credentials of the members of the newly-elected session of the Creek Indian 
Council or General Convention were improper or irregular.”354 Chief Davis denounced 
the 1944 Constitution and formed a new Creek Indian Council, filling positions with 
members he personally appointed from the various tribal towns.355 This act “caused a 
furor in the tribe.”356 Eventually the Council sued the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Okla-
homa state court, seeking to set aside Chief Davis’ actions.357 The court sided with the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) and found that the federally-appointed Principal Chief 
was “the sole embodiment of [tribal] authority.”358 The Oklahoma court declined to in-
tervene on behalf of the Council, essentially ruling that Davis’ appointed body was fed-
erally authorized by virtue of Davis’ appointment.359 The implicit lesson to be drawn 
from these events is that the unofficial Council was the de facto government of the Creek 
towns, and the BIA and Davis went to great lengths to try to suppress it. 
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 357.  Id. at 1139. 
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Despite the denouncements from the BIA and Davis, the elected Council continued 
to meet, holding regular sessions until sometime in the late 1950s, and “apparently con-
sider[ing] itself the representative primarily of the full-blood and restricted Creeks.”360 
After Chief Davis’ victory in state court, subsequent Councils were appointed by the 
Principal Chiefs and served in an advisory capacity.361 
At that point, the BIA decided to eliminate any further elections of the Principal 
Chief, leaving the position to be filled by appointment only at the will of the President of 
the United States.362 As the court in Harjo v. Kleppe tersely wrote, “the affairs of the 
Creeks were administered without even a token of democracy.”363 Popular elections were 
reinstated by Congress in 1970, and Claude Cox was elected in September, 1971.364 By 
that time, the unofficial tribal Council was meeting every two months.365 
C.  Federal Litigation 
Nearly twenty years after the lawsuit against Principal Chief Davis, several repre-
sentatives from etvlwv governments, unhappy that the federal government continued to 
treat Principal Chief Cox as the only leader of the Creek tribe, filed an action for declara-
tory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior, Thomas S. Kleppe, in fed-
eral district court.366 The members claimed that federal government officials were violat-
ing the 1867 Creek Constitution “by recognizing the Principal Chief as the sole 
embodiment of Creek government and allowing him to commit and spend tribal funds 
without the previous consent of the Creek National Council.”367 Resolution of the case 
necessarily required the federal court to declare whether the 1867 Constitution of the 
Creek Nation had been abolished by federal law. The case, therefore, was a critical turn-
ing point in constitutional history for the Creek Nation.368 Harjo v. Kleppe is notable for 
the court’s impressive analysis of Mvskoke history and government as affected by U.S. 
federal law.369 
The plaintiffs questioned “the legitimacy of Cox’s authority to disburse tribal 
funds and enter into contracts on behalf of the Creek Nation without the approval of the 
Council.”370 The plaintiffs argued that the 1867 Constitution gave “lawmaking power” to 
the National Council and put financial affairs under their control.371 Conclusively, “Con-
                                                          
 360.  Id. 
 361.  Id.  
 362.  Id. 
 363.  Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1139. 
 364.  Principal Chiefs Act of 1970, Oct. 22, 1970, 84 Stat. 1091) (authorizing popular election for the Five 
Civilized Tribes). 
 365.  History of the Creek Nation, MCINTOSH COUNTY DEMOCRAT, Dec. 20, 1973, at § 2. 
 366.  Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Andrus]. The initial lawsuit was filed 
against Secretary Kleppe, but by the end of the litigation, the named defendant was Secretary Andrus. 
 367.  Id. at 950-51. 
 368.  Id. at 953. 
 369.  Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1119-41 (D.C. 1976).. Woven into the historical analysis was a 
review of the Curtis Act (June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. 495), the Five Tribes Act (Apr. 26, 1926, 34 Stat. 137), the 
Appropriations Acts of 1908 (Apr. 30, 1908, 35 Stat. 70) and 1909 (Mar. 3, 1909, 35 Stat. 781), and the Act of 
Oct. 22, 1970, (84 Stat. 1091). See id. at 1122, 1126, 1133, 1139-40. 
 370.  Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1115. 
 371.  Id. 
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gress, between 1866 and 1906, on several occasions specifically recognized the Creek 
National Council as the ultimate repository of power within the Creek national govern-
ment.”372 Defendants argued that various statutes had “relieved the Creek Nation of suf-
ficient authority that it has been rendered incompetent to handle the affairs of the tribe 
under the 1867 Constitution.”373 Furthermore, “Congress was aware of the fact that the 
affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes . . . were being administered by Principal Chiefs or 
Governors and therefore ratified this form of government when it enacted the Act of Oc-
tober 22, 1970, 84 Stat. 1091.”374 
The Kleppe court noted that “factional rivalries do appear to have played a signifi-
cant part in motivating plaintiffs to file the suit.”375 Yet the “only relevant” issue for the 
court was whether the plaintiffs’ challenge consisted of “internal tribal issues” or if it 
arose under U.S. constitutional law.376 This case was not questioning “the propriety of 
tribal actions, but the legality of actions of federal officials pursuant to federal statutes,” 
in dealing with only one branch of the tribal government.377 Ultimately the court agreed 
with the plaintiffs: the federal government had acted illegally through the “policy and 
practice of the Interior Department in recognizing and dealing with defendant Cox, Prin-
cipal Chief of the Creek Nation, as the sole embodiment of the Creek tribal government, 
and “in refusing to recognize, facilitate or deal with a Creek National Council as a coor-
dinate branch of the tribal government responsible for certain legislative and financial 
functions.”378 
The federal court provided historical examples of “factionalism,” or power strug-
gles between rival parties, that were similar to what was at issue in that case and is at is-
sue today.379 Thus, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s contemporary re-acknowledgement 
was rooted in the same kind of factionalism that had once served as the foundation for 
reciprocity and balance. The white and red sides of the Creek spirit were finally vindicat-
ed in the colonizer’s court. The Mvskoke people then had to re-establish a government 
structure that would meet the needs of a twentieth century tribal government, but philo-
sophical differences made that very difficult. 
PART VI: AUTONOMY: 1976–PRESENT 
The opinion in Harjo v. Kleppe is unusual in that a federal judge mandated a tribal 
constitutional convention.380 Although the opinion recognized an ongoing effort on the 
part of Principal Chief Cox’s administration to draft a constitution for the Creek nation, 
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166 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:123 
the federal judge was concerned that the process had no input from the Creek political 
body as a whole.381 Therefore, the opinion required the creation of a five-member com-
mission to draft a fresh document with more democratic input.382 During the next three 
years, Claude Cox’s administration advocated for a new constitution that would more 
closely mirror Oklahoma’s constitution as opposed to the 1867 model.383 Chief Cox op-
posed the inclusion of etvlwv governments as part of the government structure.384 A draft 
constitution was approved by the commission in August 1979.385 Two months later, the 
new Muscogee (Creek) Nation constitution was ratified by a slim majority.386 However, 
participation was low, and only 30 percent of the “qualified voters” actually voted for the 
new constitution.387 
A.  1979 Constitution 
The 1979 Creek Constitution differs from the 1867 Muscogee Constitution in sev-
eral significant ways. First, it defines citizenship based on federal government allotment 
rolls.388 Second, it creates a unicameral legislature with no role for etvlwv govern-
ments.389 Third, it sets minimum “blood quantums” for government officials.390 
Like the 1867 Constitution, the 1979 Constitution provides for three government 
branches. First, executive power rests with the Principal Chief.391 The Chief has enumer-
ated powers, including agency appointment power and preparation of an annual budg-
et.392 Yet, both of these functions require the Chief to act “[w]ith the advice and consent” 
of the Muscogee (Creek) National Council.393 The Muscogee (Creek) National Council 
is the tribe’s legislative body.394 This unicameral body makes policy, yet the Council 
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must present each bill to the Chief for approval and signature or rejection, and “[e]very 
ordinance, order, resolution, or other act intended to reflect the policy” of the Nation 
must be signed by the Chief.395 
The structure of the National Council, now popularly elected by geographic divi-
sion, disenfranchised the etvwlv governments as constitutional constituents, although Ar-
ticle II indicates that “[t]his Constitution shall not in any way abolish the rights and privi-
leges of persons in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation to organize tribal towns or recognize its 
Muscogee (Creek) traditions.”396 The 1979 Constitution allows for certain Creek “char-
tered communities” to be affiliated and recognized by the national government.397 
Judicial power is vested in a tribal Supreme Court under Article VII, by far the 
shortest article in the Constitution.398 The six members of the Supreme Court are ap-
pointed by the Principal Chief and subject to majority approval by the Council.399 The 
judiciary also includes “such inferior courts as the National Council may from time to 
time ordain.”400 The Muscogee Nation began developing its court system based on this 
constitution in 1982. 
Meanwhile, many Mvskoke people continue to adhere to traditional etvlwv tradi-
tions, although the majority of Mvskoke people today identify as Christian.401 The etvlwv 
governments are now known as “ceremonial towns” in English, which would suggest 
that they lack any real political authority. However, individual etvlwv continue to exer-
cise ceremonial and political authority today. “Each Ceremonial Ground has officers that 
correspond to a modern President or Governor, Legislator, Administrator, Judges and 
Soldiers or Policemen.”402 
B.  Constitutional Litigation Post-1979 
The current Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Court is creating its own body of constitu-
tional jurisprudence, but has struggled to develop a jurisprudence which embraces tradi-
tional Mvskoke values. Some of the earliest decisions issued by the court show tremen-
dous deference to the American legal system; the more recent cases show less reliance 
on American law and herald the emergence of a unique, twenty-first century Mvskoke 
constitutional jurisprudence.403 This time period also demonstrates the continuing inter-
nal struggles of Mvskoke (Creek) governance. Instead of Red/White, Upper/Lower or 
Canadian/Arkansas divisions, however, tension surfaces as inter-branch disputes. 
The court has struggled with constitutional interpretation since the 1979 Constitu-
tion was ratified, issuing numerous decisions concerning power struggles between the 
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other two branches of government.404 Major power struggles between the Principal Chief 
and the National Council have arisen in the context of elections, procedural law-making, 
and contracts with private companies.405 
Clearly, the court has a centuries-old system of tribal common law as a starting 
point in its journey to fashion a tribal-centric jurisprudence in harmony with its traditions 
and cosmogony. On one hand, many of the opinions mention traditional tribal governing 
principles. On the other hand, those same opinions tend to rely almost exclusively on 
federal substantive law in reaching its final decisions. In the following sections, we con-
sider how the court is developing a constitutional jurisprudence blending these two 
worlds. In the earliest cases, the court exhibited tremendous deference to and admiration 
for the U.S. Supreme Court and federal law.406 
1.  Deference to American Law 
In the first major constitutional decisions of its existence, the contemporary Mus-
cogee Supreme Court relied almost exclusively on American constitutional legal princi-
ples. The first case, Beaver v. National Council, was decided in 1986.407 This decision 
was followed four years later by another case, Preferred Management v. National Coun-
cil, in which the court continued to espouse American legal principles.408 These deci-
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sions used basic American constitutional rules to decide cases rather than Muscogee 
common law. For example, in Beaver, the court determined that a Council-ordered spe-
cial election was unconstitutional, but did not rely on Mvskoke common law or history to 
reach that conclusion. The court lavished praise on American law and used the opinion to 
wax poetic about the superiority of the U.S. Constitution.409 Instead of looking to the 
Muscogee (Creek) Constitution and the tribe’s own historical government to determine 
whether the special election was constitutional, the court declared that the constitution 
was “patterned after the Constitution of the United States of America . . . [t]herefore, the 
decisions of the United States courts having to do with the historical separation of gov-
ernmental powers shall apply with equal force to the government of the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation.”410 
The court, in the space of a four-page opinion, essentially discounted any use of 
traditional culture or justice as a basis for jurisprudence.411 The ordinance allowing for a 
special election was invalid not because it was inconsistent with Muscogee traditional 
and governing philosophy, but because the U.S. Constitution and jurisprudence holds 
that the legislature may not act as a judiciary in matters of elections.412 
In 1990, the Muscogee Supreme Court went a step further in its deference to U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions. In Preferred Management Corp. v. National Council, the court 
was faced with a dispute that raised an important question about the court’s personal ju-
risdiction over non-tribal parties.413 As an initial matter, the defendant, Preferred Man-
agement, argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because it was a 
non-tribal entity.414 The court rejected this argument by relying on three sources of 
law—two U.S. Supreme Court cases and one tribal ordinance.415 The emphasis on the 
Supreme Court opinions allowed the court to bypass crucial questions of inherent author-
ity. Instead of using the opportunity to declare their inherent right to hear cases arising 
out of the tribal constitution, the court instead stated that its authority to hear the case 
originated from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Montana v. United States, which 
was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1981 (the Muscogee court refers to this deci-
sion as “controlling”).416 As almost an afterthought, the Muscogee court mentioned tribal 
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 411.  Indeed, the opinion seems somewhat dismissive of any reference to Mvskoke traditions: 
We too have dreams about our sacred campfires, bountiful forests and streams and roam-
ing herds of buffalos, but we awaken in a vastly changed world. We put our Nation and 
people at a distinct disadvantage in competing with progressive society unless we adopt 
the legal ways and means by which all business is conducted in America. 
 Id. at 64 (emphasis added).   
 412.  Id. at 63. 
 413.  Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. at 43-45. The dispute arose when the National Council refused to 
honor a purported contract with Preferred Management (a private company which provided management ser-
vices for tribal health care facilities) that an executive officer had arranged. The case implicated separation of 
powers concerns about the national budget, since the executive branch allegedly entered into monetary obliga-
tions without full consent of the Council in violation of the constitution. The private company wanted to see the 
contract enforced; the Council argued that it was invalid as a matter of tribal law. 
 414.  Id. at 43. 
 415.  Id. at 43-45. 
 416.  Id. Montana v. United States is a seminal federal case on tribal civil jurisdictional authority. In 1981, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held in Montana that a tribe has the authority to regulate “the activities of non-
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statutory law, which authorized jurisdiction over non-Indians under conditions expressed 
in the Montana decision.417 
The court did some independent tribal constitutional analysis, but relied almost ex-
clusively on American legal authority.418 There was no discussion of whether an Ameri-
can conception of a checks and balances system was consistent with traditional govern-
ment, though the court did note that maintaining three separate branches of government 
would be good for the Nation in the long run.419 
The dissenting opinion in Preferred Management is also worth mentioning for two 
reasons: First, it further demonstrates the deference the court was giving to the U.S. Con-
stitution during this period.420 Dissenting Justice Howe noted that “[t]he Judicial Branch 
must not be made a political activist on either side of this conflict, for ours is only to 
faithfully adhere to the Constitution of the Creek Nation and Great American Constitu-
tion which governs us all.”421 The level of reverence given to the U.S. Constitution re-
flects the other decisions of this period. The second reason the dissent is worth noting is 
that Justice Howe accurately predicted future conflicts between the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the Muscogee government.422 Justice Howe believed that the National 
Council did not have standing to bring the suit in the first place.423 He wrote: 
 
The National Council has the Constitutional right to hire independent 
counsel in the furtherance of its lawful duties, but that right is grossly 
abused and perverted when the National Council hires an attorney to 
                                                                                                                                               
members who enter into consensual relationships with the tribe or its members through commercial dealings, 
contracts, leases or other arrangements.” Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). The Muscogee 
court relied on this holding as the basis for jurisdiction over the matter. Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. at 
43. The court also cited the “minimum contacts” doctrine in a U.S. Supreme Court opinion. See Int’l Shoe Co. 
v. Wash. Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 417.  Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. at 44-45 (the statute “mandates assertion of jurisdiction over non-
members when disputes involve either: 1. the political security of the Nation; 2. the economic security of the 
Nation and its members; or 3. the health, safety and welfare of tribal members”). After establishing jurisdiction, 
the court then determined that Article V, Section 3 of the Muscogee Constitution prohibited the executive 
branch from entering into a contract without the approval of the National Council. Id. at 46-47 (Article V, Sec-
tion 3 states that “[t]he Principal Chief shall prepare the annual budget requests and supplements thereto and 
with the advice and consent of the National Council administer funds within the control of the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation”). The court held that since the contract with Preferred Management had not been approved by 
the National Council, it was void ab initio. Id. at 47. 
 418.  For example, one of Preferred Management’s arguments was that ruling in favor of the Council would 
eviscerate the power of the executive. Id. The court responded by noting that such a system works for other 
governing bodies, including the American government. Id. One practitioner journal article suggested that Pre-
ferred Management  was the Muscogee Nation’s Marbury v. Madison moment. Ed Edmondson & June E. Ed-
mondson, The Creek Nation’s Marbury v. Madison: Preferred Management Corp. v. National Council of the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 77 (1991). But, a closer reading of Preferred Mgmt. Corp. 
suggests otherwise. The court did not rely on inherent judicial review authority, but instead relied on federal 
case law to establish the authority of judicial review. See generally Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. 37. 
 419.  Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. at 45. 
 420.  It was not just the Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Court that was showing great esteem for federal law dur-
ing this period. The Muskogee (Creek) District Court stated in one decision that “we are certainly more fortu-
nate than the founders of the United States Constitution as we have their wisdom, knowledge, and experience 
to follow.” Cox v. Kamp, 5 Okla. Trib. 530, 535 (Muscogee (Creek) D. Ct. 1991). In addition, perhaps more 
telling, the district court stated, “[w]e cannot believe that the founders of this [Muscogee] Constitution intended 
it to be greatly different from the Constitution of the United States.” Id. 
 421.  Preferred Mgmt. Corp., 2 Okla. Trib. at 49 (Howe, J., dissenting). 
 422.  Id. 
 423.  Id. 
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bring lawsuits against members of its executive branch of government. 
To give legal standing to such an abuse is unconstitutional and invites 
chaos in tribal government.424 
 
His prediction of chaos in the tribal government would be borne out in the following 
years. 
2.  Transition Period: Less deference to American law 
A series of decisions beginning in 1993 can be distinguished from the earlier peri-
od because the court provided some level of independent Mvskoke legal analysis. The 
1993 case, Courtwright v. July, implicated concerns about the vertical separation of 
powers in the Creek Constitution, namely how the constitutions of statutorily-created 
“chartered communities” within the tribe would interact with the Muscogee Nation’s 
Constitution.425 The case involved a dispute over a voting amendment made to the 
Checotah Indian Community (“CIC”) Constitution.426 The voting amendment restricted 
CIC voters to those who had attended three or more community meetings.427 
The Supreme Court ruled that the community constitutional amendment violated 
the laws of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation.428 The court found that voting was a “funda-
mental right” by citing Supreme Court precedent.429 Then, the court used what amounts 
to a strict scrutiny analysis of the amendment, holding that the Checotah Board of Direc-
tors did not have a compelling government interest in restricting the vote to persons who 
had attended three consecutive community meetings.430 There was no analysis of the 
                                                          
 424.  Id. 
 425.  While the traditional etvwlv governments are not formal constitutional constituents under the 1979 Con-
stitution, smaller groups of Mvskoke people have organized local entities until Title XI, Chapter 1 of the Mus-
cogee Code. These “chartered communities” can then receive grants and other resources to establish local 
community centers and cultural meeting places. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§  3-101-3-
204. Chartered communities can draft constitutions, which must be approved by the Principal Chief. Id. at § 1-
101. 
 426.  Courtwright v. July, 3 Okla. Trib. 132, 138-40 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 1993). In 1987, 
the CIC Constitution was amended by the Checotah Board of Directors to limit participation in community 
elections to members who attended three consecutive community meetings. Id. at 139-40. Vernon Courtwright, 
a member of CIC who was ineligible to vote under the amendment, brought suit in district court, claiming that 
the amendment was improperly passed and that the new law violated the Muscogee Constitution. Id. at 141. 
Courtwright lost his case in the Muscogee District Court, but the decision triggered enough concerns about 
constitutional order that the Supreme Court allowed the Attorney General to intervene and appeal the decision. 
Id. 
 427.  Id. at 139-40. 
 428.  Courtwright, 3 Okla. Trib. at 141. The court determined that the CIC amendment violated the Mus-
cogee Constitution because it denied citizens their “inalienable rights to equal protection and due process of the 
laws.” Id. The court’s reasoning is a bit confusing. The court held first, that since the CIC Constitution required 
that amendments be passed by a majority vote of members and that no such vote had taken place, the amend-
ment was invalid. Id. at 143. That holding is fairly straightforward, but the court expanded the holding to say 
that charter community constitutions could provide “more rights and liberties than the Creek Nation’s Constitu-
tion, but in no event may [they] grant less.” Id. at 143. Since the CIC constitutional amendment process only 
required a pure majority, it was more “restrictive” than the Muscogee Constitution which requires amendments 
to pass by a two-thirds vote. Id. at 143. The court also held that requiring a citizen to attend a certain number of 
meetings in order to have the right to vote denied Checotah members equal protection under the law. Id. at 146-
47. 
 429.  Id. at 146 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964)).  
 430.  Id. at 144-45. Checotah’s vice chairman apparently testified that the purpose behind the CIC amend-
ment was to “prevent a group of individuals from attending a community meeting and swaying the vote in the 
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Muscogee (Creek) Constitution, nor any mention of Muscogee (Creek) tradition. The de-
cision largely follows similar analysis by federal courts and continues the pattern of us-
ing American law to interpret the Muscogee (Creek) Constitution. The decision does not 
include any reference to the traditional etvlwv structure, nor the history of the tribe as a 
confederated government. 
However, there is an aspect of Courtwright that points to a new level of independ-
ent constitutional analysis by the court. Up until that point, the court had based its juris-
dictional authority on outside rules and reasoning from federal law. In Courtwright, the 
court turned away from this jurisdictional reasoning and instead relied on its status as the 
judicial branch of the government.431 The court stated: 
 
A constitution, by its very nature, serves as a limitation on the power of 
the government. Without judicial interpretation, however, it may be 
construed to have as many different meanings as it has readers. Thus, 
once a case or controversy concerning the meaning of a constitutional 
provision reaches the courts, then the courts become the final arbiter as 
to the constitutionality of governmental actions as they relate to the 
constitution which empowers them. In other words, if the legislature 
does not provide for firm constraints on official action, then courts 
must do so. The question becomes, then, whether the amendment to Ar-
ticle V, Section 5 of the Checotah constitution offends the constitution-
al integrity of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation.432 
 
That was the first indication by the court that its power was established by the 
1979 Constitution and the inherent authority of the tribe, not simply because the United 
States conferred or recognized such power. Thus, 1993 marks the emergence of a con-
temporary Mvskoke-specific jurisprudence. 
Five years after Courtwright, the Muscogee Supreme Court again distanced itself 
from the early deference to U.S. opinions in what may be the only “Big Tobacco” tribal 
case.433 The Muscogee (Creek) Nation brought suit against various large tobacco compa-
nies in tribal court using the same principles that many states had used in similar suits.434 
Not surprisingly, the tobacco companies argued that the Nation lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over their companies.435 Once the Muscogee Supreme Court reviewed the constitu-
tional question of standing, it dismissed the case.436 
                                                                                                                                               
direction of the group.” Id. The court found such reasoning wholly unpersuasive, and also noted that “mandat-
ing attendance at a meeting . . . potentially interferes with other requirements of daily life such as attendance at 
one’s job, and attention to one’s family.” Id. at 146.  
 431.  Id. at 142-43. 
 432.  Id. 
 433.  See Shelly Grunsted, An Effective Smoke Screen?—The Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s Civil Complaint 
Against Big Time Tobacco and the Battle of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 567 (1998). 
 434.  Complaint, Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Am. Tobacco Co., 5 Okla. Trib. 401 (D. Ct. of the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation 1998) (No. CV-97-27). Namely, the tribe alleged that the major tobacco companies had en-
gaged in numerous torts which resulted in harm to tribal citizens. Id. at 108-14. 
 435.  See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Dist. Court, 5 Okla. Trib. 447 (Sup. Ct. of the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation 1998). 
 436.  See id. 
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Ironically, in deciding that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction over the tobac-
co companies under Creek and federal law, the court began to carve out more constitu-
tional independence, noting that “any federal authorities considered in this matter are 
limited to review of their persuasive value.”437 Still, there was very little Mvskoke 
(Creek) precedent upon which to rely, so nearly all of the cited law was federal.438 
By the early 2000s, the Muscogee Supreme Court had fielded fundamental ques-
tions of separation of powers, jurisdiction over non-Mvskoke companies, and the rela-
tionship between the national government and chartered communities. Constitutional 
disagreements continued. A 2002 case involved an equal protection challenge to the trib-
al election laws.439 It was here that the court began to distinguish its view of jurisdiction 
from previous decisions, the first instance of the court really building on its own consti-
tutional precedent.440 The court rejected the constitutional challenge, ruling that the stat-
ute met the rational basis standard.441 
Throughout the next few years, the court continued to incrementally turn to 
Mvskoke law in place of American law as internal constitutional disputes intensified.442 
Two significant cases, Ellis I and Ellis II, involved disputes between the executive 
branch and the legislative branch.443 In both cases, the court ruled in favor of the execu-
tive branch, citing separation of powers as a crucial test of constitutionality.444 
Ellis I began as a contract dispute.445 Essentially, the case was a question of 
whether or not the National Council could, through legislation, mandate that the Princi-
pal Chief act in a certain way with regard to gaming contracts.446 For the first time, the 
court analyzed only the Muscogee (Creek) Constitution language in coming to a deci-
sion.447 The court laid out a constitutional tenet: The Muscogee (Creek) Constitution 
must be strictly construed when the language is plain.448 In addition, the court made nu-
merous references to its own previous decisions, recognizing tribal court precedent as the 
preeminent binding authority.449 Finally, the court made special note that the Muscogee 
                                                          
 437.  See id.  
 438.  The court’s citations included: Mallard v. United States Dist. Court., 490 U.S. 296 (1989); Allied 
Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (1980); United States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1996); In re 
Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d. 380 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 439.  In re Constitutionality of NCA-01-115, 7 Okla. Trib. 366 (S. Ct of Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2002). 
 440.  NCA-01-115 required that employees of the Nation take a leave of absence from work if they wanted to 
run for office within the Muscogee government. Id.  
 441.  Id. While the Muscogee Constitution was determined to be the controlling law, there was no more men-
tion of how a rational basis review was required by the constitution, or why the law violated it. The court only 
noted that the Muscogee Constitution was fashioned after the U.S. Constitution and has always supported the 
separation of powers. Id. 
 442.  E.g., Oliver v. Nat’l Council, 9 Okla. Trib. 475 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2006). 
 443.  Ellis v. Nat’l Council, 9 Okla. Trib. 190 (S. Ct of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 2006) [hereinafter Ellis 
I] and Ellis v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation National Council, No. SC 06-07 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Na-
tion 2007) (opinion and order of citation for contempt) [hereinafter Ellis II]. 
 444.  See Ellis I, at 196-99; Ellis II, at 5-11. 
 445.  See Ellis I. 
 446.  Id. 
 447.  Id. 
 448.  Id. at 198-99. Plain language is a fairly standard method of interpretation. An earlier district court opin-
ion in an unrelated case had also adopted the “plain language” standard. Burden v. Cox, 1 Okla. Trib. 247, 254 
(Muscogee (Creek) D. Ct. 1988); see also Cox v. Kamp, 5 Okla. Trib. 530, 534 (Muscogee (Creek) D. Ct. 1991 
(agreeing that “the Constitution of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation must be strictly construed and interpreted”). 
 449.  See Ellis I, at 196-202. 
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(Creek) people have had a long history of practicing separation of powers.450 
One year after Ellis I was decided, the same parties were once again before the Su-
preme Court, this time because of salary changes instituted by the National Council.451 
Ellis II suggests that the era of the court’s deference to American jurisprudence may be 
coming to an end.452 The court found in favor of the Principal Chief and ruled that the 
National Council had overstepped its constitutional boundaries.453 In Ellis II, the court 
relied almost solely on the Muscogee Constitution and case law in reaching its deci-
sion.454 
3.  Progressive Period – The Emergence of Independent 
Constitutional Jurisprudence 
Ongoing constitutional strife and internal disputes culminated in a 2008 constitu-
tional amendment process.455 During the 2008 convention, over one hundred constitu-
tional amendments were proposed.456 Less than fifteen received enough votes from the 
convention to proceed to the national ballot, and twelve amendments appeared on the 
2009 ballot.457 On November 7, 2009, Mvskoke (Creek) citizens voted to ratify eleven 
amendments to the 1979 Constitution.458 A significant dispute has arisen regarding both 
the substance of some of the amendments, as well as the procedural process used by the 
Constitutional Commission and the election board to circulate and certify the amend-
ments.459 
The proposed amendments were controversial for a variety of reasons—but two in 
particular have become the subject of litigation in tribal courts. First, one amendment 
changed the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The 1979 language allowed suits 
between tribal officials to originate in the Supreme Court.460 Amendment A114 required 
                                                          
 450.  Id. At the same time, however, the court still relied heavily on federal law in coming to its decisions. 
Specifically, the court used a U.S. Supreme Court case to establish the plain language standard. Id. at 198 (cit-
ing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989)). The court also pointed out, once again, that the Mus-
cogee Constitution was modeled after the U.S. Constitution and, therefore, the Muscogee courts should be con-
sistent with the U.S. courts. See Ellis I, at 197-98. 
 451.  Ellis II, at 1-2. 
 452.  The Court also had strong words for the continued political strife between the Chief and the Council 
and vowed that it will not be intimidated by either branch of government. Id. 
 456.  See Ellis II, at 20-21. 
 454.  There are a few passing mentions of U.S. court cases and governmental decisions, but these references 
are not relied upon, nor is the Muscogee Constitution compared to the United States Constitution. See generally 
Ellis II. 
 455.  The convention was governed by Article IX, Section 2 of the 1979 Muscogee Constitution. MUSCOGEE 
(CREEK) CONST. art IX, § 2.  
 456.  Clifton Adcock, The Tribe Will Hold its First Constitutional Convention in at Least a Century This 
Weekend, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 6, 2008, 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/article.aspx/Creeks_to_hold_historic_meeting/20081106_11_a11_hthetr244772. 
 457.  George Tiger, Creek Nation Votes Today on Proposed Amendments, MUSKOGEE PHOENIX, Nov. 6, 
2009, http://muskogeephoenix.com/columns/x546267732/Creek-Nation-votes-today-on-proposed-
amendments?start:int=15. 
 458.  Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Bd., No. SC 09-10, at 2 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 
2010) (opinion and order). Two amendments were not presented: A78 and A99. 
 459.  In 2012, the National Council passed 12-074, which declared that the 2009 Constitutional Amendment 
process was fraudulent. Sterling Cooper, Huff Elected Second Speaker at Regular Session May 19, 42 
MUSCOGEE NATION NEWS, June 1, 2012, at 1-2 (on file with the author). 
 460.  Thus, many of the constitutional decisions decided by the court since 1979 did not have the benefit of 
lower court inquiry or fact-finding. It may be that the drafters of the amendments were seeking to add another 
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such suits to originate in district court.461 Second, amendment A67 reduced the size of 
the National Council—a controversial move that would necessarily mean that some 
council members may no longer have a seat in the government. Moreover, A67 changed 
the structure for voting for representatives to an “at-large” system as opposed to voting 
by geographic district. 
After the constitutional amendment election, council member Robert Trepp (along 
with other members of the National Council) filed suit in the Supreme Court to enjoin 
implementation of the amendments, alleging that the certification of the amendments 
amounted to illegal changes to the constitution.462 At first, the Supreme Court declined to 
hear the case, stating that it did not have original jurisdiction over the matter (pursuant to 
the new amendment)463 and ordered Trepp to file his lawsuit in District Court. The Su-
preme Court furthered ordered the National Council to appoint a special judge to hear the 
case.464 
Over the next year, the National Council declined to confirm any of the Chief’s 
nominated special judges.465 By December 2010, with the fate of the amendments hang-
ing in the balances, the Supreme Court decided it had to rule on the matter.466 The signif-
icance of this case is not only the fact that the court used the Muscogee (Creek) Constitu-
tion and court precedent to justify all its holdings, but that the Court also makes a point 
of distinguishing the Muscogee (Creek) Constitution from the U.S. Constitution. 
In order to resolve the dispute, the court claimed original jurisdiction over the case, 
even though they had denied it previously in spite of A114.467 Ultimately, the court de-
termined that the Muscogee (Creek) Constitution and previous decisions by the court al-
lowed a claim of original jurisdiction in the case, even though the district court had not 
had an opportunity to rule on the matter.468 The court distinguished the Creek Constitu-
tion, explaining: 
 
By way of comparison, the United States Supreme Court is limited in 
its exercise of original jurisdiction. (citation omitted). No such limita-
tion on Supreme Court jurisdiction exists in this Nation’s Constitution. 
As such, the appropriate exercise of original jurisdiction is a matter of 
                                                                                                                                               
layer of court review in such important cases.  
 461.  Amendment A114, Proposed Amendments to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Constitution 5 (on file with 
author). 
 462.  Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Bd., No. SC 09-10 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Dec. 3, 
2010) (opinion and order). Amendment procedures for the constitution are outlined in Article XI. MUSCOGEE 
(CREEK) CONST. art. XI.  
 463.  Codified at Art. VII, Sec. 6. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) CONST. art VII, § 6.  
 464.  Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Bd., No. SC 09-10, at 2 (Muscogee (Creek) Dec. 3, 2010) (opinion 
and order). District Court Judge Patrick Moore had been one of the Constitution Commission members, so he 
recused himself from hearing the case. Id. at 9 n.14. The court also issued a restraining order, preventing the 
Election Board from certifying the amendments until the matter was settled in court. Id. at 3. 
 465.   Perhaps the council members believed that appointing a special judge to hear the case would be an 
acknowledgement of the district court’s authority, which in turn would mean acknowledging that the amend-
ment process itself was legitimate. 
 466.  Id. at 2. 
 467.  Id. 
 468.  Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Board, No. SC 09-10, at 8 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 
Dec. 3, 2010) (opinion and order). 
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prudent judicial policy within the Muscogee (Creek) Nation frame-
work. This Nation’s Constitution vests all judicial power within the 
Supreme Court and other inferior courts. As the Supreme Court is the 
ultimate authority within this Nation’s judiciary, this Court must be the 
final arbiter of when the exercise of original jurisdiction is proper.469 
 
The court in Trepp established that public policy concerns (such as confusion 
about the constitution) can create original jurisdiction.470 The court ultimately dismissed 
Trepp’s suit on standing grounds.471 
This is an important decision because it reflects the court’s official disapproval of 
the seemingly endless series of lawsuits between the legislative and executive branch-
es.472 The court in Trepp referred to Justice Howe’s dissent in Preferred Management 
and held that the other branches of government only have limited ability to sue in court, 
and that “[t]he ultimate source of authority in Mvskoke government is the people.”473 
That holding not only provides the court with a way to prevent further litigation, but also 
shows an analysis with an eye towards tribal tradition and values.474 Only three non-
Mvskoke cases are cited in the opinion. 
Trepp, then, is not so much a turning point in Mvskoke constitutional jurispru-
dence as it is the culmination of a movement by the court towards self-determination. In 
particular, the analysis throughout the clarifying memo relies on the Mvskoke Constitu-
tion and the court’s own precedent. The court went from going out of its way to defer to 
the U.S. Constitution to explaining why the Mvskoke Constitution provides the court 
with different roles and powers. It is a significant change in court policy and provides a 
new foundation from which a unique Mvskoke jurisprudence can continue to grow. 
The Trepp decision also raised a significant procedural question for the court. Only 
five justices participated in the opinion (with three writing for the majority and two dis-
senting); there was one abstaining justice.475 The dissenters issued a memorandum which 
claimed that the abstaining judge should be considered a dissenter and therefore the 
judgment was tied three to three.476 Statutory law says that “a judgment or decision of 
the Supreme Court requires the approval of a minimum of four (4) justices.”477 The ma-
jority in Trepp wrote a clarifying memo in order to explain that an abstaining judge is not 
                                                          
 469.  Id. at 6 n.8. 
 470.  Id. at 2. 
 471.  Id. at 24. 
 472.  Id. at 14-15 (describing it as “a never-ending parade of litigation”). 
 473.  Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Board, No. SC 09-10, at 15 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Na-
tion Dec. 3, 2010) (opinion and order). 
 474.  Codified Court rules indicate that "[a] judgment or decision of the Supreme Court requires the approval 
of a minimum of four (4) justices." MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION S. CT. R. APP. P. 22. The majority in Trepp 
wrote a clarifying memo in order to explain that an abstaining judge is not automatically dissenting from the 
opinion. Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Board, No. SC 09-10 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 
Dec. 3, 2010) (clarifying addendum to Dec. 3, 2010 majority opinion). Therefore, from the court's perspective 
the majority opinion stands and the amendments were ratified by the Nation. 
 475.  See Trepp v. Muscogee (Creek) Election Board, No. SC 09-10 (S. Ct. of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation 
Dec. 3, 2010) (clarifying addendum to Dec. 3, 2010 majority opinion). 
 476.  Id. (response to the Dec. 3rd filing by Justice Jonodev Chaudhuri, Justice Amos Mcnac, and Justice 
Houston Shirley). 
 477.  MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION S. CT. R. APP. P. 22 
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automatically dissenting from the opinion.478 Therefore, from the court’s perspective, the 
majority opinion stood and the amendments were ratified by the Nation. 
Today, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation continues to struggle with fundamental con-
stitutional questions. Recently, parties who are unsatisfied with decisions in tribal court 
have begun to appeal intra-tribal matters to federal courts in Oklahoma.479 This is a trou-
bling development, as federal oversight has historically been a grossly ineffective means 
of furthering Mvskoke self-governance. One of the founding principles of Muscogee 
self-governance is enshrined in the 1979 Preamble—namely, the people shall aspire to 
“strengthen and preserve self and local Government.”480 Federal court intervention has 
the potential to steer the Nation away from self-determination.481 
One of the virtues that is often mentioned when American-style separation of pow-
ers is praised is that it makes government more insulated from tyranny. It must be re-
membered that the American Constitution was drafted in the aftermath of a revolution, 
and so independence was the primary motivation. Many tribal constitutions were drafted 
in the aftermath of removal and allotment, so survival was the primary motivation. If the 
Mvskoke government is arguably insulating itself from tyranny through the development 
of constitutional law, the tyranny largely originates from the United States. Thus, turning 
to the federal courts to resolve Mvskoke disputes can be said to be a fundamentally un-
constitutional strategy. The better strategy, one more consistent with self-determination, 
is to cultivate Mvskoke-centric jurisprudence. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTUREOF THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION 
A perfect replication of the intricate, interconnected governments found in pre-
removal, traditional Mvskoke government is unlikely to emerge from this twenty-first 
body politic.482 Such a pure restoration would be impractical; only a few tribal towns 
remain intact, and most of those towns exercise only ceremonial authority in their re-
spective communities. Moreover, many of the specific governmental styles of the pre-
1500s era would likely not be well-adapted for contemporary culture and technology. 
Even had the Mvskoke not been forced to change its governing bodies and legal struc-
tures, it would have gone through its own internal structural changes to respond to 
changing times. However, many themes and tenets of core traditional Mvskoke values 
remain and must continue to be cultivated in the jurisprudence of the Court. The Court 
itself has acknowledged as much: “For our tribal society to function properly, we must 
honor and respect the respective roles of others. Our Constitution is based on our societal 
values, as a people, and that interconnectedness lays out the separate powers and duties 
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of the various branches of government.”483 
Cultivating and nurturing Mvskoke jurisprudence can be done in a variety of ways. 
For example, where relevant, acknowledging and exploring the painful twentieth century 
history of the Nation might establish more credibility among both the litigants and the 
citizens at large. More references to Mvskoke language and culture would amplify ef-
forts to revitalize the language and instill pride in the youth.484 The legal history of the 
Nation should be documented, taught, and analyzed by citizen-scholars. Collaborations 
between language, culture, and law have been promising developments for many tribal 
nations in recent years.485  The government founded and now operates the College of the 
Muscogee Nation, which opened in 2004.486 One of the missions of the College is to 
“strengthen the sovereignty of the Muscogee Nation,” a mission consistent with the very 
essence of tribal court development.487 The College will continue to be an ideal forum 
for continuing and formalizing Mvskoke-centric intellectual dialogue about politics, law, 
and sovereignty. 
The fact that Mvskoke governance continues today in spite of many attempts by 
European and American forces to annihilate it is a testament to the strength and adapta-
bility of Mvskoke political thought and constitutional principles. The history of Mvskoke 
leadership demonstrates the ability of Mvskoke people to advance fundamental princi-
ples even in times of great chaos and change. Moving forward, then, the independence of 
the court from both local politics and federal oversight is vital. The line of cases decided 
by the court in the coming decades will no doubt have a profound impact on the future of 
the Nation.488 As the court presses forward, it will continue to add to the body of case 
law that is Mvskoke jurisprudence, a contribution to what U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis called “laboratories of democracy.” Most important, these cases will both 
reflect and stimulate an ever-evolving conversation about the way Mvskoke people gov-
ern themselves and relate to one another. 
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